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[ Deep Spiritual Mysticism of Lovers of Fatima al Zahra ]

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[Excerpts]

SHIA ISLAM: ORTHODOXY OR HETERODOXY?

By: Professor Luis Alberto Vittor (1994,2006)



# The Issue at Hand

In a concise chapter dealing with Shiaism, Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb echoes a persistent prejudice: the categorical affirmation that Shia Islam with respect to Sunni Islam, is “the other main sect of Islam--the only important schismatic sect.” To him, Shiaism is the ubi consistam [essence] of the definition of sect which, according to his understanding, embraces diverse “systems of Islamic doctrines and beliefs which are generally repudiated by the orthodox...as heretical”. To speak of “heresy in Islam, however, requires a sufficiently clear understanding of its meaning. When Gibb uses the word “heretical,” however, he does not use it as descriptive adjective nor is he necessarily making a value judgment. For him, it is merely a matter of fact which needs to be analyzed. The most disturbing aspect of this conception of Shiaism, however, is not the simplistic explanation it gives to its historical development, but rather its excessively broad scope. It does not say anything for want of saying too much.

Gibb attempts to give a broad definition of “sect” and “heresy,” applying it to everything in Islam that remotely resembles other Eastern traditions. The evidence he provides, however, is far too scarce. He insists on demonstrating, at any cost, that Shiaism is inherently schismatic and sectarian. He uses the literary elasticity of the word “sect” [in English] to explain that Shia Islam, due to its minority status in the Muslim world, must constitute a doctrinal off-shoot or a split from the Islamic majority.

At the same time, he wishes to prove that true “orthodoxy” is to be found almost exclusively in the Sunni doctrinal tradition. The erroneous application of the term “sect” to Shia Islam, however, does not resolve the problem of its historical origin. A true understanding of Shia Islam cannot be obtained through insufficient scholarship. It can only be reached through a close analysis of its religious and spiritual psychology as manifested in the Islamic world.

The definition of Shiaism as the only “sect” of Islam is due in part to its more profound esoteric character which stands in contrast to the essentially exoteric character of Sunni Islam. Although there are no substantial differences between the fundamentals of faith of Shia and Sunni Islam, Shiaism seems to possess something more profound [in the spiritual realm]. [Despite this fact,] Western scholars tend to view the differences between Shia and Sunni Islam as the result a mere political dispute relating to the succession of the Prophet Muhammad rather than a transcendental metaphysical matter. [However,] it is only through an understanding of the mystical dimension of Shiaism that one can understand why it appealed to Hindus and Persians while at the same time [some of] the Arabs viewed it with reticence. In fact, even when some scholars stubbornly persist on calling Shiaism an “Aryan Persian creation,” history is clear on the issue: Shiaism was introduced into Persia in the 16th century by a Turkish dynasty, the Safavids, who were, as is well known, a tariqah or Sufi brotherhood. Until then, the Persians were mainly Sunnis. Shiaism was only unanimously accepted among them ten centuries after the death of Ali ibn Abi Talib and the events that contributed to the creation of Shiaism.

We are not going to get down to details at this point. For now, what needs to be stressed is the perfectly orthodox nature of Shia Islam and its reality as an integral part of the Islamic revelation. This fact is so clearly manifest that it cannot be overlooked on the basis of tendencious historical arguments that insist on confining Shiaism within the imprecise bounds of concepts like “sect” or “heresy.” [In this aspect], modern Western criticism of Shiaism is unjustified and misguided. Contrary to the common views of Orientalists, Shia Islam is not a “sect,” a “heterodox” form of Islam or anything else that fits into the definition made by Gibb or any other specialist.

One of the most common mistakes made by Orientalists is the attempt to study Shia Islam on the basis of such simplified sectarian parameters. It is all the worst when this approach reinforces the argument that Shiaism is the result of a separation, when this Western concept of religious schism is totally alien to traditional Islamic thought. If we wish to move beyond these objections against the orthodoxy of Shia Islam, we should first note that Westerners often consider Islam, in contrast to the multifarious branches of Christianity, as a conglomerate of mutually contradictory doctrines which is patently not the case. We are not claiming that real differences never existed within Islam . They did indeed exist, particularly during its initial period between the seventh and tenth centuries. It was then that a great variety of philosophical, theological and theosophical theories started to manifest themselves in all areas of Islamic thought.

These different ideological currents that flourished were not “sects” in the true sense of the term and are most adequately called “schools of thought.” While some of them survived to the present, most of them have disappeared, leaving us only their names. In any case, we must not overlook the process of cultural and ideological interaction which takes place when Islam comes into contact with foreign cultures. Such contact is an important aspect of what differentiates the Islamic tradition from others. Although there are many traditions within the tradition, Islam has always maintained its cohesion and unity, a fact that often draws the attention of outside observers.

Although Islam is united, it is not uniform. The sciences studied in any traditional civilization--namely, a civilization based on divine revelation--depend on the metaphysical principles and the religious fundamentals of that revelation. Consequently, Islamic doctrines, regardless of their modes of expression, have always reflected and echoed the central doctrine of divine unity [tawhid]. It is due to the centrality of tawhid that Islam was capable of integrating various systems of thought into its perspective and final objective. The presence of diversity within the Islamic tradition does not undermine its transcendence and interior unity. Rather, as Seyyed Hossein Nasr explains, it is the means that assures the spiritual unity in a world composed of a conglomerate of diverse cultures, languages and races (Shia Islam 3-28). It is in this sense that it is appropriate to speak of sects. In order avoid any possible misunderstandings, however, it is essential to clarify the sense of the term.

# Towards a Definition of Heterodoxy in Islam

The word “sect” comes from the Latin sequi or sequor and means “to follow.” According to this definition, the term excludes the idea of schism or doctrinal rupture. In Christian usage, the term “sect” is not free from pejorative connotations although it is much better than the label “heretic.” Nowadays, in Christian terminology, the word “sect” refers mostly to a body of people sharing religious opinions who have broken away from a larger body. “Sect” in the sense of “cult” refers to a group of people who follow the “revelations” made by its founder. Such sects, like the Mormons for example, differ from the Church, in the non-theological sense of the term, in that they recognize another new revelation. The sect insists on the need to understand the neo-testamentary text which is different in essence from the sacred scriptures. Besides that distinction, and as can be observed within the Adventists and Jehovah’s Witnesses Witnesses" , the cult believes in collective, not individual salvation, which is exclusively limited to its members.

It must be understood, however, that the sects which the Church opposes in the name of orthodoxy are merely other religions with their own rites and dogmas which are only heretical with respect to official orthodoxy. If we attempt to remove the slippery polish from the word “sect,” turning it into a simple technical term devoid of subjectivity, we will see that “the meaning of sect is closer to the Spanish word séquito [group of followers, adherents and devotees] than to what is commonly understood by secta [sect] and its derivative sectario [sectarian] which curiously and arbitrarily are applied to it”

A persistent residue, which has adhered to the word “sect” by use and Abuse, has been regularly documented. In its common meaning, it applies to exclusivist religious minorities which are opposed to a commonly accepted Church tenet. Sects are born through dissent and view themselves as a small flock of chosen ones. This is how quantitative differences come about between Church and sect. For the Western religious historian, what defines a sect is its character as a separate group, much more than its minority status, which can eventually reach the size of a Church. This is where we see the motives which drive Western religious historians like Gibb to come up with unilateral interpretations of complex concepts and doctrines. They explain and analyze them in terms that prevent the possibility of truly understanding what a sect or religion, such as Islam, really represents. It can never be sufficiently stressed that the general application of Western terms like “orthodoxy,” “heterodoxy,” “church” and “sect” to Islam are grossly misapplied, especially as Islam does not have a Church to define orthodoxy or the powers to excommunicate. The use of such terms ends up simplifying complex issues, associating them with Western religious phenomena which do not have equivalents in the language of Islam. There is no place for such terms as “orthodoxy, “heterodoxy,” “church,” “sect,” and “heresy” in an Islamic tradition rooted in the concept of divine unity. While there is diversity within Islam, there is not, simply by a slight difference in approach, a contradiction of its central doctrine of divine unity nor the gregarious separation in its fundamentals of faith or its community [ummah]. Rather, they are diverse tendencies that make up Islam and so long as they do not stray from the fundamentals of faith, they can all claim with some justification to represent its most authentic expression. With this understanding, one can appreciate that in Islam there does not exist a clear line between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. As a result, the various Islamic currents are neither radically misguided groups which have broken from official orthodoxy nor are they separated from one another as are the Christian sects of today.

Unlike the Western world, the Islamic world defines orthodoxy by means of the profession of faith or shahadah: La ilaha illa Allah, Muhammadun rasul Allah [There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah]. The shahadah is the most universal proclamation of divine unity and is not a strictly defined theological formula. There exists, of course, an orthodoxy in Islam, without which no doctrine or tradition is possible. However, contrary to Gibb’s affirmation, Islamic orthodoxy has not been defined by ijma’ [scholarly consensus] in any restricted or limited sense. What is more, in Islam there has never existed a religious institution capable or deciding who is orthodox and who is not.

Infatuated with every Western prejudice, Gibb seems to have translated the old axiom of divide et impera [divide and conquer] into the more modern: classify and discard! But to understand the history of Islam, however, requires more than merely counting or organizing dates. The eye of the scholar must be capable of discerning the profound print of his subject, its depth, its substance and its essence. He must belong to a tradition and provide us with comprehensive and broad formulas called critical approaches and methodologies. Gibb easily forgets that in Islam, so long as a practice or a belief does not contravene the Islamic law and can be traced back to the Quran and the sunnah it is clearly orthodox and cannot be deemed heretical. This principle also applies to the genuine spiritual paths of Islamic mysticism in the Sunni world whose devotional practices and metaphysical doctrines cannot be judged on the criteria of “orthodoxy” that govern the exoteric forms of the religion. This is particularly so since the esoteric can never face the exoteric on the same plane. Both operate on different but not divergent orders of the same reality. In other words, they constitute the “core” and the “skin” of the religion.

In Nahj al-balaghah, the First Imam most brilliantly and masterfully settles the question of the diversity of schools and currents in Islamic thought. He describes them as parts of the spiritual freedom given by God which are in accord with His Oneness: “Praise be to Allah who established Islam and made it easy for those who approach it and gave strength to its columns against any one who tries to overpower it … It is the most bright of all paths, the clearest of all passages. It has dignified minarets, bright highways, burning lamps, prestigious fields of activity, and high objective.”

“This Islam is the religion which Allah has chosen for Himself … He made Islam such that its constituent parts cannot break, its links cannot separate, its construction cannot fall, its columns cannot decay … It consists of columns whose bases Allah has fixed in truthfulness, and who foundation He has strengthened, and of sources whose streams are ever full of water and of lamps, whose flames are full of light, and of beacons with whose help travelers get guidance.”

As one can gather from these words, the Islamic tradition has, in a general sense, provided a broad umbrella which embraces a multiplicity of points of view as distinct as the doctrinal masters of thought who formulated them. The only tension between them--when there was any at all--has normally been between the exoteric and esoteric dimensions of the tradition. This tension has always alternated harmoniously within the same dynamic rhythm.

The temporal predominance of one over the other in the successive manifestations of the same living organism is comparable to the diastole and the systole of the heartbeat. Without alternation, these two essential movements continue in harmony, like the exoteric and the esoteric. Like any other tradition, Islam would cease to beat without them and would turn into a rigid form without a pulse. In other words, the orthodoxy of the distinct schools of thought in Islam does not manifest itself solely through the preservation of its outer forms. It is expressed equally by its natural development and, especially, by its capacity to absorb any spiritual expression which is not essentially alien to the doctrine of divine unity.

It is true that in Islam there is what in the language of the West is defined as “sect.” The word “sect” in Arabic is firqah which means “to separate” and “to divide.” Let us not make the mistake, however, of considering Sunni and Shia Islam as the two main sects of Islam. Let us not differentiate between them by applying normative and schematic judgments to decide, unilaterally, in accord with the mental and moral modes of historically European-based societies, which one of them is “orthodox” and which one is “heterodox.” If we have acknowledged that there is diversity in Islam we need to recognize that there is also a means to understand its unity. The unity of Islam rests on one sole factor: the uninterrupted event of the Quranic revelation. In synthesis, the oneness of God and Islam is manifested in every aspect of its doctrinal reach in the affirmation of divine unity, the proclamation that the beginning of existence is one as ratified by the apothegm: “the doctrine of oneness is one.” For Islam, divine unity constitutes the only reason for being and the essential criteria upon which all “orthodoxy” is based, regardless of its contingent modes of expression. We can go further and affirm that, as far as Islamic thought is concerned, the doctrine of “divine unity” is the common denominator shared by all traditional monotheistic faiths without exception, so long as they adhered to pure and original monotheism. We can expand upon this more and proclaim that the universal and the continuous in all things operate through this Unique Principle which invariably is everywhere and always identical to Itself.

The great metaphysical currents from east and west unanimously agree that the ultimate reality of all things, the essential state of all creatures, their beginning and their return, is divine unity. In this sense, this Islamic concept runs parallel to those of Xenophanes, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus. It runs parallel with those of Judaism, Taoism and Buddhism as well as those of the Advaita Vedanta Vedanta" formulated by Master Sankara, Master" as a recapitulation of the Veda which, according to Muslim Gnostics, is the revelation God made to Adam. This also applies to Alexandrine hermeticism--to the extent that it is a continuation of the tradition of Hermes or Idris, as he is known in the Islamic world--which is also embraced and integrated into Islam.

The truth of the One Absolute, the identification of all things with a Sole Beginning, was revealed by the Quran for Islam in the form of the shahadah. The divine profession of faith stresses that “He is Allah, the One and Only” (112:1), “there is no god but Allah” (47:19) and that “He has no partners” or, as the chapter “Divine Unity” or “Purity of Faith” declares, “there is none like unto Him” (112:4).

To be considered as orthodox, Islam requires a true and sincere belief in monotheism. The contrary of tawhid is shirk: the attribution of partners or associates to God, idolatry and polytheistic paganism. Shirk is a mortal sin without possibility of pardon. It is heresy incarnate which is why the Quran warns: “Allah forgiveth not that partners should be set up with Him; but He forgiveth anything else, to whom He pleaseth; to set up partners with Allah is to devise a sin Most heinous indeed” (4:48).

For Islam, the essential element which guarantees true orthodoxy is the belief in “monotheism.” This applies not only to its own schools of thought or spiritual paths, but also to any traditional religion prior to Islam. The term “monotheism,” however, is inadequate when it comes to translating the sense of al-tawhid. The word “monotheism” can only be used to accommodate the lack of a better term in English and other Western languages, without giving it an exclusively religious connotation. The doctrine of “divine unity” is essentially metaphysical in the true and original sense of the term. But in Islam, as in other traditions, it also implies--in its direct application to diverse contingent domains--a whole network of complicated and interlacing parts. These parts, within Islam, are not necessarily incompatible, despite their respective characters, as they are in the West since in Islam there is no division between the functions of “religion” and “state.”

Islam is a complete civilization and a complex culture in which all activities and spheres of daily life, individual, societal and governmental must reflect divine unity. Islam is not merely a “religion” if by religion one exclusively means an ecclesiastic system of belief and practice. More than that, Islam is a way of life with a faith or, if one wants, a traditional way of life [din] which, through the Quran, the sunnah and the shariah, proclaims a faith and establishes rituals. It also prescribes an established social order on the basis of the “fundamentals of faith” or the “pillars of Islam” for individuals and society in all areas that determine the condition and the raison d’être [reason for being] of the orthodox Muslim. An orthodox Muslim, as we have seen, is anyone who is sincere in his faith.

A 20th century Gnostic, al-Shaykh al-Alawi from Mostagan, a qutb or spiritual pole of Sunni Islam of the Shadhili school, said that to be an orthodox Muslim it is sufficient to observe five things: to believe in God and recognize Muhammad as his final prophet, perform the five daily prayers, give the prescribed alms to the poor, fast and make the pilgrimage to Mecca. The pillars of Islam, as a whole, are the formal expression of Islam and encompass everything which Western language designates as strictly religious. The pillars of Islam also include all of the social and legislative realms which in the Islamic world integrate into the religion. Hence, the Western concept of separation between “religion” and “state” is something foreign to orthodox Islamic thought.

Besides these five fundamentals of faith there are five other pillars of religion according to Shia Islam which are in conformity with the sunnah of the Prophet. They include the belief in divine unity; the belief in the prophecy; the belief in resurrection and the hereafter; the belief in the twelve Imams as successors of the Prophet and depositories of his guardianship, the spiritual and temporal power of Islam and; or divine justice.

Sunnis and Shias agree upon the three basic pillars, namely, tawhid, nubuwwah and miad. They only differ on the other two. In terms of the Imamate, what distinguishes the Shia perspective from the Sunni one is the insistence on the esoteric function and spiritual supremacy of the Imam. In Sunni Islam, this difference is formerly overcome through gnosis of Sufism in which the qutb or spiritual pole of the age represents the esoteric and initiatory role that the Imam plays in Shiaism. In terms of divine justice what distinguishes Shiaism is the stress given to this attribute as an essential quality of the divine reality. In its concept of divine justice, Shiaism considers this aspect as co-substantial with divinity. God cannot act unjustly because it is impossible for the Just to be unjust. There can be no division or contradiction in the One.

Finally, despite their external differences, Sunnis, Shias and Sufis share a stress on practice and conduct as opposed to doctrine. The faithful observance of the fundamentals of faith is what lies at the center of their thought and differences. It is only on the esoteric plane that every religious perspective can be placed so long as it does not contradict the transcendental unity which goes beyond any such limitations. It is this unity which is found in the external expressions of each religion or theological school. The transcendental unity of all religions is not broken in any way by the transcendence of Islam. Such unity is not a material extension and gradual development but rather the fundamental identity of the One within the multiple. Even if it varies to infinity, it responds in different ways to the needs of different human cultures and races. For this reason, the establishment of “orthodoxy” in Islam, based on uniformity instead of unity, as it exists with other religious forms, especially in the West, could never depend on the consensus of scholars.

Gibb’s reductionist doctrine wishes to liken Islamic ijma‘ to the “councils of the Christian Church”. It is only the metaphysical doctrine of unity which can reconcile all types of differences while maintaining the unity of the Islamic tradition, both exoteric and esoteric, over and above any tension or conflict of a political or religious order.

In this sense, Shia Islam represents a balancing totality of various points of view. Due to the profoundly esoteric character of its doctrine, it represents a "middle path" between the excessive formal legalism of the jurists and the excessive introversion of the mystics.' The tasawwuf, depository of gnosis in the Sunni world, can be defined spiritually as the Shiaism of Ali, the Fourth Caliph and First Imam of Islam.

Both Sufism and Shiaism, in accord with the traditions of the Prophet, view Ali as the "gate" of initiation to the esoteric knowledge of Muhammad who stated quite clearly: "I am the city of knowledge and Ali is its gate. Whoever wants to enter this city must first pass through its gate."

The symbol of the "gate" alludes to the esoteric function of the First Imam since it is through him that one gains access to initiation. Found in many traditions, the "gate" alludes to initiation into the Muhammadan "mysteries" or "secrets". In its universal sense, the "gate" refers to the spiritual office as the "seal" of the absolute guardianship and the esoteric pole of the prophecy who has opened the cycle of initiation which, at the same time, has been sealed by the Twelfth Imam, al-Mahdi, who closes the Muhammadan wilayah.

In short, the completion of the doctrinal legacy of Islam explains, as does the absence of any unanimously accepted human authority who has received spiritual and temporal power from the Most High, the rather indefinite character of the notion of orthodoxy outside of what is established by the Quran, the sunnah and shariah. In specific, with the exception of the Mahdi, there docs not exist in Islam a universally recognized magistrate capable of formulating new laws. The Ayatullahs [signs of God] which in our epoch appear more and more as the jurists and the depositories of the spiritual and political leadership of Shia Islam, limit themselves to interpretation of the prescriptions and mandates of the Quran. They do so in accord with a tradition passed down from generation to generation by the Twelve Imams but with nuances and even considerable differences from one mujtahid to another. One thing that must be clarified as well is that when we speak of Shiaism we refer to "Twelver" branch, also known as the Jafari school of jurisprudence. The term Shiaism embraces many branches, each with its own interpretation of Quranic doctrine. The term Sunnism embraces various exoteric branches, including the four most famous schools of Islamic jurisprudence, the Shafi, the Hanafi, the Hanbal and the Maliki. The term Sufism also embraces various branches. In the esoteric world of tasawwuf it is possible to distinguish spiritual paths equal in number to the infinite variety of souls or beings. As Ibn Khaldun explains in his Muqaddimah, the profession of divine unity is the very secret of these doctrines.

So far, we have examined the fundamental point of reference of Islamic thought regarding the concept of "orthodoxy." Clearly, Shia Islam must not be removed from this definition. Excluding Shia Islam from the realm of Islamic orthodoxy—by omission or by excess—is one of the most common mistakes made by Western scholars who wish to give it /a sectarian nature similar to reformist Christian sects. These scholars even go to the extreme of giving Shiaism an allegedly "fundamentalist" character which, in the broadest sense, applies exclusively to certain forms of modern American Protestantism.

In present times, the term "fundamentalist" is commonly applied to Shia Islam and to Islamic groups characterized by a rejection of all manifestation of secularism in the Eastern world. This is despite the fact that, in every sense, Shiaism represents the living tradition of Islam2 Both in politics and religion, Shia Islam is traditional. When faced with outbreaks of innovation Shia Muslims, like all orthodox Muslims, react with the same hostility as any who face a subversive movement which seeks to overthrow the established order. Due to its imminently esoteric nature and its acceptance of diverse levels of interpretation of the scriptures—each one more profound than the other—Shiaism is, in the Islamic world, what least resembles "fundamentalism" if understood in its correct sense of extreme superficial and sterile literalism.

It may be worthwhile to mention at this point that "fundamentalism" is a purely Christian term. It seems to have come into use at the beginning of the twentieth century and describes, first and foremost, certain American Protestant sects, particularly those with a puritanical perspective. The sects in question are noted for interpreting the scriptures to the letter of the law, from a narrow minded perspective. They reject any profound interpretation of the Bible, prohibiting any hint of hermeneutics. Notably, the term "fundamentalist" is now applied on a daily basis by many Muslims but stripped from the pejorative sectarian sense. Through a strange semantic distortion, they give the term the erroneous meaning and the distorted sense of a "return to the fundamentals" of the Islamic faith. They do so as if at some time in Islamic history, the pillars of Islam had somehow ceased to exist, visibly or invisibly, in all spheres of Muslim existence and in all their manifestations in the Islamic world. Even when they are relinquished or temporarily placed on the back burner—as in the atypical case of Turkey—they have always been fully maintained in the spiritual and esoteric order without which any return to original Islam is impossible. In this sense, the integral restoration of the true and original sense of the Revelation depends on the spiritual guidance of the Imams, the fundamental touchstone of the illuminative awakening of Islamic gnosis. They are invested with the initiatory function due to their condition as divinely inspired men and perfect interpreters of His message, well beyond the literary and philosophical paraphrase of rationalist jurists and theological puritans like Ibn Taymiyyah and those of Abd al-Wahhab.

A return to the fundamentals implies that a distancing or a partial separation from them has taken place. If returning to the founding principles of the Islamic faith is used in the sense of returning to the straight path, then this may very well require a reencounter with Shia Islam since its doctrine has always remained firmly grounded in the teachings of the Imams who are effectively the pillars par excellence. [In the Shia view,] the Imams are the fundamental pillars of Islam in the sense that the essence of the revelation was passed on to them by the Prophet, both exoterically and esoterically, through the function of the Imamate or spiritual inheritance [ilm itri], that is, the esoteric guidance of the prophetic secrets. According to the famous Tradition of the Cloak, the Prophet called his daughter Fatimah along with Ali, Hasan and Husayn and covered them completely with his cloak. This act symbolized the transmission of the universal wilayah of the Prophet, through the epiphany of the partial wilayah [wilayah fatimiyyah], to the plethora of the Twelve Imams, the Prophet's immaculate progeny.

[ Note: The word kisa means “mantle” or “cloak.” In Shia Gnosticism, the practice of wearing and passing on the mantle is associated with the passing of spiritual and temporal authority of the Muhammadan wilayah. Among the Sufis from the Sunni world, the practice of wearing and passing on the mantle is intimately associated with the transmission of the “sanctifying grace” of “blessed influx” of the wilayah [holinesss] which, in its origins, is related to Shia esoterics and the Gnostic doctrines of the Imams. The recognition of the spiritual supremacy of the Prophetic Household, namely, Fatimah, Ali, Hasan and Husayn by Umm Salamah, the wife of the Prophet, who did not include herself among them, appear in many Sunni sources like, Sahih Tirmidhi, while the recognition of this spiritual supremacy by another wife of the Prophet, Aishah, who also excluded herself from the ahl al-bayt, appears in Sahih Muslim as well as Sahih Bukhari and Tirmidhi.]

Within the bounds of the excessively arid exteriorist "literalism" which defines Protestant fundamentalism, we can only include, in relation to Islam, the exceptional case of Wahhabism. This obscure puritanical and reformist sect, derived from Sunni Islam's strict Hanbali school of thought, was founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who can be called, without exaggeration, the Martin Luther of the Muslim World. His doctrine was inspired by the ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah, a rationalist rigorist who opposed the ideas of Ibn Arabi. Abd al-Wahhab found his ideological support in the political opportunism of the upstart emir of the Dariya tribe, Muhammad Ibn Saud, the ancestor and founder of the actual Saudi dynasty which became the secular arm and executor of Wahhabism.

Like Luther with respect to Christianity, Abd al-Wahhab called for a "return to the fundamentals" of faith. These, however, were reformulated literally and were stripped of the doctrinal complement brought by the teachings of the Imams and the exegetic and hermeneutical methods instituted by the Prophet as sacred sciences aimed at discerning the inner meanings of the scripture. A "return to the fundamentals" of Islam, as proposed by Abd al-Wahhab, can only be brought about by the restorative action of the esoteric guidance of Imam Mahdi, the Hidden and Awaited Imam, and never through human initiative.

We "return" the revealed letter to the plane where it becomes real. The revelation, according to Shia Islam is both exoteric and esoteric. The process of understanding consists in starting from the exoteric in order to reach the esoteric. Metaphysical internalization, the cornerstone of Islamic Gnosticism, tends to revive, in the symbolic articulation of the scripture, its profound spiritual sense as revealed by Angel Gabriel to the Prophet according to its original enunciation. Consequently, the allegorical interpretation is the "returning ascent," the march up country of the exoteric and the esoteric. The mission of the Prophet was the founding of the exoteric which implies a descent by the spirit to every formal point of expression of the scripture. The mission of the Twelfth Imam al-Mahdi is to lead the exoteric to the esoteric in our present cycle. This is why he is called the Lord of the Age. In order for there to be a "return to the fundamentals" of Islam, it is also necessary for there to be a universal restoration of the esoteric sciences in all of their traditions. For that same metaphysical reason, it requires a man who, besides being inspired by God and being a perfect interpreter who masters the exoteric and the esoteric scripture, is a spiritual heir, an inheritor and direct descendant of the Prophet from the line of Husayn, the Third Imam.

According to Islamic metaphysics, which stems more or, less directly from Shiaism, the "heterodoxy" of any idea implies, in one way or another, the falsity of its formulations which are in absolute disagreement with the metaphysical and esoteric principles of the tradition. This is precisely what Rene Guenon warns of with respect to the Vedanta. According to this definition, orthodoxy lies in a constant balance between immutable principles. In the Islamic tradition, these principles are contained in the Quran. The balance between the letter and spirit of the revealed text constitutes the criteria of Islamic orthodoxy which is founded on faith in the oneness of God.

The discussion of Islamic sects would be worthwhile if the term was restituted, as Garcia Bazan demands, to the original sense the Romans gave it when they translated the Greek word hairesis as "sect". The Greek word which has evolved into "heretic" merely means "selection," "option," or philosophical or religious "inclination". It does not imply the idea of difference, separation or breaking from a tradition, nor does it possess the pejorative connotation that it has in Western languages. As Garcia Bazan explains, even the middle form of haireo and haireomai, from which hairesis derives, simply means "selection" or "option."

In terms of Wahhabism, whose influence continues to be observed in Saudi Arabia and much of the Muslim world, "sectarian" deviations are not ritual or doctrinal: they are scriptural. With regards to the sacred text, the Wahhabi "heresy" consists in a deformation and literal reinterpretation of the Quranic text and even of innovation in the Islamic canon They are "heretics" who are formally separated from the Islamic community, not by ritual practice, but by scriptural deviation. These rigid rigorist literalists adhere to the external aspect of the written text and reject any extensions or interpretations transmitted through the oral and written tradition. In contrast, Shia religious practice, as strict and legalistic as it may be, which assures a solid orthodoxy and orthopraxy, is accompanied, in the matter of faith, with a profound spirituality of a metaphysical and esoteric character which extends to its interpretation of the Quran, the sunnah and the shariah. It is for these reasons, for its Gnostic character, that the application of the term "fundamentalist" to Shia Islam is totally unjustified. In every sense, Shia Islam represents Islamic orthodoxy as much as Sunni Islam. Without a doubt, it is the minority status of Shiaism in the Muslim world, as opposed to ritual, doctrinal or scriptural deviation, that gives Westerners the impression that it is a “sect.”

From ancient times until the present, the notion of “sect” has not been freed from the prejudice that it applies only to small religious groups. As the old Latin proverb goes: If two do the same thing, it is not the same thing.

Obviously, these ideas about sects are applied by Westerners to whatever phenomenon they can reduce to this label. Evidently, this is done without considering their inner aspects, where major spiritual differences are really hidden. Moreover, we cannot dismiss the ill-concealed aims of certain specialists to place all minority religions into the framework of a single verdict of justification or rejection. They wish to do this by exclusively considering the external manifestations of religion, which constitute the visible skeleton of orthodoxy, when it is essentially a question of interiority.

Finally, if we have spent more time than necessary dealing with term “fundamentalism,” it is because the general use of this term conveys a “sectarian” attitude. Its use is obviously misguided and distorted because it is born out of a fanatic and uncompromising attitude in favor of one party or one idea. It is always convenient to give a sectarian nature to Shia Islam by means of the “fundamentalist” label, without understanding that the real reason for its existence is clearly traditional. The phenomenon we refer to is a common vice. In fact, it is the main reason why the Western mentality is unable to understand the Eastern spirit. Clearly, it is not a question of cultural differences or contradictions in term but, to paraphrase the words of Suhrawardi, forms of spiritual participation or perspectives between an Orient of Illumination [ishraq] and an Occident of Exile.

There is no point in denying that the most esoteric of these Islamic sciences was related to neo-Pythagoreanism and hermeticism. It was through them that Islam came into close contact with the Sabeans of Harran. They were responsible for transmitting astronomy, astrology and mathematics from Babylonian sources and later Chaldeans bound with the hermetic-Pytliagorean ideas of Alexandria to Islam. All of this is true.

It is also true that medicine and cosmology reached the Muslims .by means of the Hindus and the Persians. These sciences were eagerly embraced by Islam since, far from being secular forms of knowledge, they were intrinsically linked to the central doctrine of "divine unity." On the other hand, some aspects of classical Greek and Hindu culture, like the secular philosophies of the Epicureans, some of the cynics and the naturalism of the anatomists, barely aroused the interest of the Muslims. It was impossible for knowledge of this type, based on sensuality and a dualistic relativism, to be integrated into Islamic thought in a cohesive and cogent form since they were outside of the nature of the Gnostic experience. The Mutazilite's refutation of certain aspects of dualist and trinitarian theories, however, brought Islam a theological solution in accordance with the concept of divine unity. In their defense of Greco-Alexandrian philosophy, the Mutazilites created favorable conditions for study and scholarship in Shia intellectual circles. This affinity and sympathy between the Mutazilites and the Shias must not be confounded in any way as identity.1 On fundamental issues, such as the significance and function of the Imam, they differ completely. On that issue, the Mutazilite perspective is much closer to that of the Sunni. What is clear is that during the entire history of Islam, the pre-Islamic legacy of cosmological sciences and metaphysical doctrines were united, as they were in the Jabirian corpus or in the Epistles of the Pure Brethren, or the Brotherhood of the Pure, in a perfect synthesis. Science and scholarship from external sources never ruptured Islam's monotheistic mandate.

Modern Muslim scholars like Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ayatollahs Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai, Ayatollah Ahmad Ahmadi, and Orientalists like Henry Corbin, Titus Burckhardt, Rene Guenon and Frithjof Schuon teach us to view Islam from a perspective which appreciates the diversity within its unity. The harmonious integration of diverse systems of thought within its Unitarian perspective makes it all the more appealing particularly since it is the product of the Muhammadan spirit which is essentially metaphysical and ethical. Thanks to the research of these scholars and the research of those who follow in their footsteps like William C. Chittick, Christian Jambet and Pierre Lory, to mention only a few, Islam is no longer a mass which crushes us under its enormous religious weight. It is also no longer a primitive pastoral religion of shepherds or an Arab imitation or adaptation of Judaism and Christianity. On the contrary, Islam is now presented as a type of intelligent filter that magically selects, cleans and purifies, preserving what is of value while filtering out and rejecting what is harmful and useless from profane secular knowledge. Like these scholars, we view the transfer or transmission of the pre-Islamic legacy as a natural unveiling of the universal continuity of the same spiritual inheritance. Due to its metaphysical nature, its development is indefinite. It manifests itself in given historical moments and takes root in the most fertile field to ensure its spiritual blooming. This is how we see things as opposed to embracing theories of "influx" and "imitation." Our perspective is not a personal one. It is entirely in accord with the eternal sacred tradition.

But let us be candid. Even if we were to view Islam as the result of some historical "influx" or as a "copy" or a pre-Islamic religious model—rejecting everything that is authentic and unique in its own revelation—we should recognize as well, as does Cruz Hernandez, that even under such conditions no religion has turned out better than Islam.

It was Cruz Hernandez, the distinguished professor Madrid, who presented a staunch criticism of the methodology employed by Asin Palacios. As Cruz Hernandez points out, Palacios' attitude is not only the product of his social context and his training as a Catholic priest, it also reflects the state of scientific thought of his time. Like Cruz Hernandez, our goal is not to cast doubt on the value of Asin Palacios work as a whole by criticizing a widely held prejudice against Islam which was also applied to other religions. We all owe a debt of gratitude to Palacios for his important contributions to the knowledge of Islam during the period of al-Andalus. Although much of his work has merit, it must be stressed, however, that the methodology that he employs, and which is employed by Gibb as well, is completely wrong. Their approach is erroneous for the simple fact that it is based on a principle which is inherently flawed. The problem with their approach is the belief that for religious studies to be scientific, to come to an understanding of religion in general and Islam in particular, it is necessary to narrow things down to a few facts. Once non-essential elements have been reduced to minimal terms, to abstract formulas and to skeletal hypotheses, all traditions can be condensed into an imaginary framework of classifications that conveniently explain certain similarities between the Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions through theories of "assimilation" or "successive reproduction."

As can be appreciated, we would exhaust ourselves uselessly attempting to criticize such an understanding of religion. The case has been judged and the verdict has been given. As Rene Guenon has observed in relation to the Vedanta, Eastern and Western concepts of "religion" are profoundly different. In order to prevent such confusion from extending to Islam, it is important to remember here that tradition, as opposed to religion, is the vital source of all religious forms. A tradition does not have established dogmas or precepts; it has universal meanings which are applied to dogmas and religious precepts. At the end of this cycle and the beginning of the next cycle, it is exceedingly important not to reject tradition. So long as we believe that the part is present in the whole there will be religion. Revelation, faith, truth and religion are neither fact nor are they ideas. They are expressions of a sole spiritual beginning. In the Western world, however, specialists have a very different conception of religion. Some will argue that if you know one religion then you know them all. Others hold that if you know one religion you know none of them. And there are still others who hold that a religion outside of your own is incapable of teaching you anything and is not even worthy of consideration. These are the very same specialists who stubbornly insist on portraying Islam as an Arab invention based on Judeo-Christian traditions or a classic case of "assimilation" or "successive reproduction." Religious traditions from East and West do indeed share many similarities which are more or less obvious to scholars. Nowadays, most sincere scholars are willing to drop the term "religion" in favor of the more appropriate term "tradition," a concept that acknowledges God as the eternal source of all revelation.

# Towards a Definition of Shiaism

As we have seen before, “election,” “option,” and “inclination” are some of the comprehensive meanings the Greek language gave to the term hairesis. These meanings were passed into Latin, with the necessary etymological adjustments, as hoeresis which conveys the ideas of “opinion,” “dogma,” “party” and “sect.” Dictionaries define the meaning of “sect” as a “body of people sharing religious opinions who have broken away from a larger body.” It is often used as a term of disapproval and is thus inconsistent with its original meaning of “doctrine of a particular teacher who developed it and explained it and which is accepted and defended by a group of followers.” By straying from their original meanings and etymological roots, the words “heresy” and “sect” have been applied for centuries to those who professed “false” beliefs worthy of excommunication. In this limited sense, the word “heresy” has more in common with the Hebrew term herem, meaning excommunication and anathema, and the Arabic word haram, which means to deprive, to anathematize, to remove and to excommunicate. The words “heresy” and “sect” were used in ancient times to describe various schools of philosophy. Over the course of centuries, however, the terms acquired pejorative connotations which eventually came to dominate and replaced their original meanings. The terms “heresy” and “sect” came to be commonly applied to all religious groups which broke away from an original doctrine and who were in disagreement with the dogmas and rituals which were officially orthodox.

For the Roman Catholic Church, all protestant sects born from the Reformation were, in a strict sense, “heretical” and “heterodox” from the moment they broke away from the Vatican. From around 1971, the term “heretic,” with all of its connotations, was suppressed from the Catholic ecclesiastic lexicon. Consequently, there are no longer any “heresies,” these having been replaced with “mere doctrinal errors” which do not merit excommunication. The modern mentality was evidently unsatisfied with its classical lexical heritage and along with the older terminology it developed a wide body of new definitions. The Western world uses these terms in so many contradictory ways that they do not have a constant meaning. They apply them to religious phenomenon which they view with suspicion but which they rarely try to understand. This state of confusion is created by the modern habit of calling everything into question. It is also a reflection of the total failure of the “opinion-makers” who insist on taking the concept of “sect”--as vague as it may be--as their sole starting point.

As Rudolf Otto has explained, the use and misuse of terms likes “sect” and “fundamentalism” quickly reaches an irrational point. What is most surprising, however, is that this feeble conceptual chain has been forged and molded to subject the same unknown enemy who frequently changes forms like a many-sided proteose. The multitude of contradictory definitions proposed by the “opinion-makers”--in a dry attempt to describe diversity--actually impede proper classification.

The situation further complicates itself when some Orientalists, rather than researching thought, move on to studying ideological struggles. As a result, they divide themselves between scientific and political work. If we focus so much on this issue, it is because our critical stance requires us to do so. We are well within our rights to criticize the attitude of those who, deliberately or involuntarily, by a mere concession to modern language, spread falsehood and error. It is as if the terms “sect” and “fundamentalism” were merely simple theological references or epithets without any moral implications. We must ask ourselves: Is it really possible that the richness of classical definitions and terminology has been reduced to the point of describing general ideological types?

It should be noted that the term “sect” is unduly applied to Shia Islam without doctrinal justification and without paying attention to whether such a definition is actually compatible with its perfectly orthodox and traditional spirit. If this is not a case of terminological standardization, then what is the point of insisting on its application? Should the generic sense of “sect” be applied by default to every religious minority on the basis of the same rigid and arbitrary interpretation? We refer, of course, to those scholars who fancifully turn every minority tradition into a “sect” without considering the true meaning of its definition. In fact, these scholars often label certain religious groups as “sects” when their followers are numerically equal to the main groups within their tradition. Certain religious minorities which are considered as “sects” in the West are perfectly orthodox religious expressions. Such is the case with Shia Islam in the Middle East, Buddhism or Taoism in the Far East, to mention some of the most common examples. But, as we have seen, the tendency to give Shia Islam the stigma of “sect” is premeditated. It is not by chance that some “opinion-makers” and Orientalists have agreed on applying this term. The definition of “sect,” as they know better than anyone else, can conveniently be substituted--in a theological and philosophical sense--by the more insidiously political and provocative one which defines a sect as a “group of partisans with extreme and violent ideas.”

Faced with simplistic and reductionist interpretations which are obsessed with grouping all religious minorities under one general label, the indiscriminate application of the term “sect” continues to be accepted. This is despite the fact that the commonly accepted meaning of the term is nothing more than a convention or a deep-rooted prejudice accepted by all without reserve. Even among educated people, the very idea of “sect” always presupposes a deep-rooted reactionary and intolerant attitude, which is how the factio [sect] can be recognized and differentiated from the other majority “factions.” If anything novel is added to this connotation, it reduces itself to concrete applications that are called upon by the same semantic concessions of language that adapt to changing circumstances. We refer specifically to the neologism “fundamentalism” which implies an entire axiological classification which, when dealing with Shia Islam, even descends to the basest contempt.

The term “fundamentalist” can be correctly applied to American Protestantism since its attitude and behavior is consistent with such a definition. However, the new tendency is to give the term a political sense linking it even more strongly with Shia Islam. The use of the term “fundamentalist” in a political sense is really a recent development. It traces back to the famous controversy between American Protestants and the supporters of Darwin’s Theory of Evolution. The dispute centered on the question as to whether state education should be separated from religion as a means to promote the atheist doctrine of evolution which is incompatible with the idea of God and divine creation. At that time, the use of the term “fundamentalist” was far from commonplace. The term “fundamentalist” has acquired a political connotation which every day is more effectively integrated into the vernacular, becoming normal in English and standard in other Western languages. It is applied to a series of Islamic groups which resist and reject any type of Western interference.

Due to limitations of time and space, we cannot examine in depth the reasons why the Western world insists on applying “sectarian” and “fundamentalist” labels to Shia Islam. For the sake of brevity, we will limit ourselves to saying that the application of such terms to Shiaism is a form of reductionism which attempts to tarnish an entirely orthodox expression of Islam. Not only do such labels impoverish understanding and distort definitions, what is worse today is that they are used without any conceptual contact with the true reality of its thoughts and doctrine. Such definitions are often taken “lightly” because they do not destroy the doctrines of Shia Islam. Nonetheless, we must avoid indiscriminately applying such labels to Shiaism and other schools of thought since they imply inclusion or exclusion of Islamic doctrines on the basis of the one and only orthodoxy.

The same definition of “sect,” with some slightly different shades, prevails among the Orientalists who wrote about Sufism and Islamic gnosis in the nineteenth century. Likewise, certain Orientalists have applied the label of “sect” to Shia Islam. They were fond of giving a Christian character to certain Shia beliefs and practices rather than recognizing them as entirely Islamic in origin. These Arabists preferred the term “sect” to that of “heresy.” They categorized Muslims on the basis of Christian standards. For them, the “heretics” were those Muslims who broke away from the doctrinal unity of the Islamic “Church” while the “sectarians” were those who broke away from its socio-political hierarchy. In this respect, it is important to remember that, Saint Augustine, particularly in his admonitions against the Pelagian, Manichaean and Donatist heresies, rejected reductionism. He categorically warned how difficult, if not impossible, it was to give a definition of “heresy” that corresponds exactly to its essential characteristics. For that reason, he warned against the temptation of labelling doctrines as “heretical” considering how harmful the label of “heretic” can be.

From a subjective psychological perspective, the characteristics of heretics include intolerance, obstinacy, rebellion and unsociability. Those who hold erroneous, misguided or false ideas, yet believe with good faith that their doctrine is the same as taught by the Church, cannot be labelled as heretics or sectarians.

Imbued with such ideas, some Orientalists use the Catholic concept of heresy as their theoretical framework. As a result, they labelled the Sufis as heretics because they were “mystics” who believed in doctrines which differed from those of the majority orthodox Sunni “Church.” Despite the fact that they profess the same fundamentals of faith, the Shias were labelled as sectarian because they broke away from orthodox Sunnism. After drawing these dogmas from Christian doctrine, Orientalists rushed to apply them to Shiaism, labeling it as “heretical,” “schismatic” and “sectarian” merely because it represented a minority tradition, a fact which in se and per se [in and of itself] does not constitute heresy. They failed to heed Saint Augustine’s warning that appearances can be deceiving. They reduced Shiaism to the level of a “heretical sect” despite the fact that there are no doctrinal differences between Sunni and Shia Islam. Unfortunately, some contemporary Orientalists--the heirs of the old mentality--continue to stubbornly label Shiaism as a “sect” outside the fold of Islam. Although Shias profess to be Muslims and share the same beliefs as Sunnis, they are, in the eyes of these specialists, openly sectarian extremist heretics.

In short, the tendency of some Orientalists to separate Shia Islam’s visible or exoteric aspects--social and political--from its esoteric aspects-- mystical and metaphysical--started in the nineteeth century and intensified in the twentieth and early twenty-first century. According to Alessandro Bausani, the increasingly radical differentiation between a political and religious Shiaism provides an opportunity for Arabists and Orientalists to eclipse the West from the spiritual, metaphysical and esoteric aspects of a formal traditional expression (4:112-15). We have reason to fear that this initiative is a last ditch effort on the part of the West to subject one of the last genuine reserves of traditional thought into an indefinite zone of relative obscurity and of temporal oversight. In other words, when some Orientalists and “opinion-makers” take interest in Shia Islam, these professional polemicists are motivated by a desire to create a false and distorted image of Shiaism, isolating and stressing its exclusively political aspect. Is this not a most extreme case of ideological fundamentalism?”

The one thing these theories--and others which are even more groundless and fanciful--have in common is a desire to single handedly understand the global reality of Shia Islam in all of its dimensions: exoteric and esoteric, political and religious, metaphysical and spiritual. But in fact, the only thing they want to retain from their research is that Sunni Islam is the rule and Shia Islam is the exception. The Shias, they claim, view themselves as the small flock of chosen ones. They are those who split from the orthodox majority, those who were schismatic, who sought to foment dissent, spread discord and provoke division because of some political question related to the succession of the Prophet. As will be seen, these claims made by scholars are based exclusively on Sunni sources. And it is these Sunni scholars who brought the idea to Western scholars that, like the councils of the Christian Church, the election of the Caliph or successor of the Prophet can be decided “democratically” by means of consensus.

# Scholarly Consensus: An Accepted Method for Controlling Heresy?

Orientalists who follow the Christianizing interpretation of Islamic thought have attempted to present the doctrine of consensus as an accepted means of controlling “heresy” in Islam. According to Gibb, the doctrine of consensus can be viewed from the perspective of Christian orthodoxy and can be likened to the case of the council.

Despite their external differences, a certain analogy can be made between the concept of “consensus” of the Christian Church and the Islamic concept of consensus. In some cases the results of both procedures were quite similar. For example, it was only after consensus was acknowledged as a source of law and doctrine that a definitive proof of “heresy” became possible. Any attempt to interpret the Scripture in a way that negated the validity of a given and accepted solution was by consensus, an act of “innovation” and “heresy”.

Gibb’s main thesis is that the concept of “council” in Islam forms part of a secular organism that mends Islamic doctrine. It does so in light of a sovereign authority, thus fulfilling the work of purging and purifying matters of faith that can be assimilated into the work of ecclesiastic canonists. He understands the concept of “council” as a juristic entity, like a council of bishops. In order to protect the theological doctrine of the “Church,” the Islamic Caliphate relied upon the doctrine of consensus as the basis for the orthodox refutation of “heretical” Shia ideas.

When Gibb speaks of consensus in terms of councils or ecclesiastic consensus, the distinguished Orientalist maintains himself firmly within the Christianizing interpretation of Islam. The word “council” is derived from the Latin concilium which comes from cum, “with,” and calare, “to call” and “to proclaim,” hence the sense of convocation and assembly. The word “council” is a Latin term which defines, much like the Greek root of Church, a flock or congregation of faithful Christians under the guidance and direction of their pastors. It applies to a group of individuals with the same character in a double sense: active like convocation of bishops and passive like a congregation of the same in an organization, a society or a collegial body. Viewing the doctrine of consensus through the Christian concept of council presupposes the existence of an orthodox “Church” in Islam which, like the Christian Church, can be recognized and differentiated from other “sects” or “heresies,” and as a juridical, hierarchical, sovereign, visible, empirical, and easily perceived institution for all to see.

Gibb’s ecclesiastic conception of Islamic consensus is misguided and even false. It fails to appreciate that in Islam both elements are identical: the doctrine of consensus as a source of law and canon of the Scriptures, on the one hand, and Islamic orthodoxy, both internal and external, on the other. Both of them co-exist and coincide in the application of the shariah and the sunnah of the Prophet as sovereign expressions of the Quran in both Sunni and Shia Islam.

Let us now turn from a general critique to some more specific observations. It must be noted that Gibb’s Christianizing conception traces back to the 1950s, a period when the type of distinction we are discussing was not viewed with the same importance as it is currently. Hence, the absence of a broader and more elaborate perspective is fully justified. Many of the problems we are discussing here, such as the question of “sects,” had barely even been posed.

What we would have liked to observe, among the Orientalists who followed the same Christianizing line as Gibb, is a degree of academic, analytical and philosophical evolution. Above all, we would have liked them, starting with Gibb, the Orientalist from Oxford, to come to a better understanding of the questions raised by the study of Shia Islam. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Besides a handful of honorable exceptions, the majority of research published in the West during the last decade of the fifties and even well beyond consists of nothing more than worthless compilations whose theoretical weakness is in sad contrast to the solid scientific work done by Orientalists in the past. These solid scholars include Reynold A. Nicholson, Louis Massignon, Jacques Berque, Miguel Asin Palacios, Miguel" and, why not, even Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb.

Despite their incomprehension of the Islamic spirit, they practiced and professed a science which was more consistent with their intellectual qualifications. Their work is less suspicious of compromise with ideological controversy which reduces religious polemics, in all of its shades, into terms of extreme triviality and doubtful scientific integrity. It is the ancient affliction that appears to worsen in the West, especially in recent times, in which a host of “opinion-makers,” turned into “specialists” of Islam, have come forth like black heralds repeatedly croaking the same mistakes ad nauseam.

Without doubt, the knowledge and analogical application of these theological principles must have seemed very convenient to Gibb in his work of comparing the Islamic concept of consensus as a consensus of scholars with that of the Christian council as a consensus of ecclesiastics. This is even more evident when Gibb alludes to the role of analogy in his comparison and confesses that such a comparison is possible despite the external differences of the Christian councils. This is absolutely false. Regardless of such esoteric formulaic divergences, there is no Church in Islam.

Furthermore, there is no organized clergy in Islam in the ecclesiastic sense of the priesthood because Islam does not accept the mediation between God and man. In Islam, there does not exist a religious establishment lead by a Pope with a hierarchy of bishops, cardinals and priests, all ranked according to their level of merit and the closeness to the central power of the Church. We must not forget that any attempt to look for examples of consensus in Islam comparable to the Christian councils of Nicea, Lyon, Letran, Trent and the Vatican would be useless.

In the entire history of Islam, there has never been a case in which qualified scholars and jurists gathered in diverse synods to examine a doctrine that they considered erroneous and who then related their conclusions in letters to a prelate in which they asked for this error to be condemned as a heresy by the entire Islamic community. There were many times, however, when Caliphs or mujtahidun reacted on the basis of arbitrary and erroneous decisions of incompetent authorities, ignorant of the very basis of the discussed doctrine. We are not claiming that “heretical” doctrines or misunderstood minorities have never been challenged, refuted, condemned and persecuted in Islam because the facts speak for themselves.

We have the examples of martyrs for whoever would categorically deny any affirmation to the contrary. These include al-Hallaj, Suhrawardi, Uways al-Qarni, Qanbar, Maytham al-Tammar and, among the followers of Ali, the very Imams, of which the most tragic case was that of al-Husayn, the Lord of Martyrs.

Is it not clear that all of these deaths were the consequence of emphatic and arbitrary decisions? In any event, we have made no attempts to deny or to justify the persecution of those who were accused or suspected of heresy as this goes beyond the scope of this study. On the contrary, our goal here has been to demonstrate that the concept of consensus as a type of council is an erroneous misrepresentation of the function of consensus in Islam. In the Muslim tradition, the concept of consensus does not express an accepted mode of controlling heresy or the unanimous authority of all the scholars of the Islamic community.

We understand perfectly well that Gibb’s goal is to present the concept of consensus in socio-religious terms that are more readily understandable in the West, by linking it to the Christian concept of consensus. In our opinion, however, such simplifications do nothing other than complicate any attempt to penetrate Islamic thought, particularly when it is done by examples that are as divergent as they are foreign to the Islamic faith. When we say that concepts such as “councils” are foreign we do not mean to imply that Islam is somehow backwards or less up to date as religious institutions in the West, particularly it terms of its formal religious expressions.

According to the generally accepted etymology given by Arabic linguists, the technical term ijma comes from the Arabic root jamah. It has several definitions, each of which relates to the concept of agreement, the first of which is “consensus.” Hence, there can be no doubt as to the concept the word expresses. Both the Arabic word ijma and the Latin word consensus convey the idea of being free from coercion, being able to distance oneself from that which is oppressive and limits the freedom of choice. The mujtahidun define ijma as “point of view” and, in such a sense, it is closer to the Vedic concept of darsana than the Christian concept of council. In effect, consensus as a source of law and doctrine, does not present contradictory concepts, but rather different points of view and differing aspects of the same many sided concept.

The doctrine of consensus is obviously found in both the Sunni and Shia traditions. However, both of these orthodox tendencies interpret and apply it differently. It is universally agreed that what has more weight in Islamic law is the Quran, the Sunnah, and the companions of the Prophet, those who lived alongside him, were chosen by him, and who heard his sayings directly. This is followed by the followers of the companions and, finally, the followers of the followers, those who received from their masters what their masters had received from their masters.

With the disappearance of this last generation, for the majority of Islamic schools of jurisprudence the consensus now rests with the mujtahidun, whose edicts vary in accord with their philosophical postures. If Sunni Islam declared that the door of personal deduction of the law was closed in the 10th century [we know that some Sunni clerics have now reopened the door], Shia Islam, on the other hand, never recognized this closure.

Shia jurists and theologians, known as mujtahidun, have always defended this right. Although enlightened individuals and scholars can appreciate the inner meanings of the sacred law in all of its dimensions, none can any longer claim perfection and infallibility. Since scholars, regardless of their erudition, are human, their understanding of the law can only be imperfect. Hence, they must allow themselves to be guided by the consensus of the sunnah of the Prophet and the authorized interpretations of the Holy Imams.

In conclusion, it is wise to recall that the fundamentals of faith and principles upon which the Muslim faith is based are irrefragable. Complete faith requires complete acceptance of tenets which are not and cannot be the work of men or the result of human consensus. God is the Sole Sovereign and the Final Source of Legitimate Authority. The essence of His law is immutable truth. His law is more immutable than the process of human thought for it is eternal and never changes.

# The Infallible Divine Authority: Source of Law and Doctrine in Islamic Consensus

In the preceding pages, we have addressed the issue of consensus. We have seen that, on the one hand, the Islamic concept of consensus is interpreted as an intellectual acceptance of divine truth and, on the other hand, as an expression of trust in God and the Prophet. We have also noted that, to a certain degree, the Islamic concept of consensus requires the acceptance of educated opinions acquired through a thorough study of Islamic law and through the intellectual effort known as ijtihad. It is thus the obligation of every observant Muslim to place his trust in the wisdom of others. The entire structure of Islamic society is based on this trust in the rulings of scholars since, for all intents and purposes, the acceptance of these religious rulings constitutes an acceptance without reservation of revealed law.

The concept of consensus as a source of law and doctrine implies, in an objective sense, the acceptance of a body of divinely revealed laws which must be accepted in their entirety as a manifestation of the acceptance of the sovereign authority of God. In a subjective sense, embracing divine authority represents the sanctifying flux [barakah] instilled by God in the human soul through the bounty bestowed upon the Prophet. Such submission is never blind and unconditional. Blind following is unacceptable when the motives that are expounded are not sufficiently convincing or do not coincide with the inner meanings of the revelation. If, as we have said, some Islamic tenets, mandates or principles must be accepted completely, totally and wholeheartedly, it is because they are directly ordained by the revelation, which is free of errors, and because they are based on the authority of the Prophet and the Imams. In Islam, in order for a norm or dictate to be accepted, it must be firmly based on God’s revelation and the sunnah of his Prophet. In such cases, transcendental and ineffable reality becomes evident as soon as reason elevates itself beyond the sphere of sensible truth and attains the level of intelligent truth. It is for this reason that it is the obligation of every Muslim to refrain from submission to a dictate until he is convinced with certainty that what he is accepting is legitimate and in complete accord with revealed truth. This is the teaching of Shiaism as taught during the time of the Prophet and further developed on the authority of the Imams as part of their prophetic supplement.

Regardless of their efforts and actions, ordinary human beings do deserve the rank of absolute authority over others. Even the greatest of human efforts cannot be compared to the divine gift of prophecy and the grace of holiness [wilayah]. The authority of the Prophet was the result of revelation. The Prophet passed his supreme status and the mandate of his mission, the spread of revealed truth, to his cousin and son-in-law Imam Ali. This divine authority was passed on to his descendants and successors who are the definitive authorities of Islam whose obligation is to amplify it and actualize it. The human efforts of the Imams would be of little or no benefit were it not for the fact that their external words and actions were accompanied by the rays of light which flow within them, the Muhammadan truth, the gnostic or esoteric reality, the divine presence in their hearts which are the true depositories of eternal wisdom. It is for this reason that they receive the titles of “legatees” and “executors” of the revelation. As can be appreciated in light of the above, consensus is an intellectual assent of divinely revealed truth, assent which does not exclude trust.

Whenever infallible divine authority is absent, human life loses its direction and ceases to be oriented towards God as a final destination. Although God calls all human beings to obedience and the straight path, not all are reached. And not all of those who are reached by His call respond to it, because not all are chosen, obey and submit to His authority. The Prophet and the Imams are the most obedient and submissive to God’s authority. This is because they are the Chosen Ones, the purest souls on earth. They are epiphanies [“appearance” or “manifestation”], theophanies [“illuminations” or “revelations”] and signs of the infallible divine authority. Such authority cannot be claimed by just anyone. Rather, it must be considered as a gift or grace from God. When Ali, the depository and inheritor of the infallible divine authority and the Vicar of God, was preparing himself to enter the scene of Islamic life, not even the opposition and collusion of the followers of Abu Bakr could impede this apparition which was announced by the Prophet prior to his death and awaited by his family and closest companions. Ali struggled tirelessly against them and became their most dreaded enemy. He always upheld his right to the succession and debunked all of the arguments used against his legitimate aspirations. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.

From the opposition and collusion of the followers of Abu Bakr, to the resistance and reaction of Ali and his followers, the historical development of the Caliphate revolved around the issue of the succession of the Prophet. They involved one another and illuminated one another. In light of authentic and trustworthy sources, the situation becomes clear and enables us to see that the historical emergence of Shiaism was based on metaphysical and cosmological principles, even though the chain of secular conflicts have externally emphasized the political side. This leads us to the fundamental issue which interests us most: the concept that Shia Islam was a divinely ordained development destined to convert itself into an invisible axis and visible hinge of the entire prophetic wilayah. In order to understand this, it is necessary to examine its exoteric reality on the inside, starting with its esoteric and Gnostic interior.

Mukhtar al-Thaqifi The Enlightened Messianic Activist

The Shia Insurrection as Political Reaction, Reparation and Revenge

In order to explain the transformation that Islam went through since the rise of Shiaism, Muslim and non-Muslim historians point to two factors derived from the same cause: the political struggle for the Caliphate. The first factor was that the political influence of the oligarchy transformed itself into a timocratic power, a state in which political power increases with the amount of property one owns, through the support of the triumphant majority. The second factor was that the political will of a marginalized minority became a medium of resistance. Depending on the personal inclinations of previous researchers, they argue in favor of one of these two factors. For us, both factors are two aspects of the same cause. For Western research scholars, it is not always easy to get used to the idea that in Islam, the relationship between the religion and politics is much closer than it is in the West between the Church and the State. It is even more difficult for them to accept that in Shiaism religion and politics are two aspects of the orthodox development of the same doctrine, rather than parallel or separate tendencies that revolve around the same sphere but without any effective connection between them.

“Recent studies,” says Bausani, “distinguish more between a political Shiaism, which included the purely political partisans of Ali and his family…, a religious Shiaism, which included activists impregnated with Gnostic ideas, who were based mostly in Kufa, in Mesopotamia, and whose main representative … was the politico-religious agitator al-Mukhtar who took over Kufah in 685-686. He preached Messianic doctrines and started some very interesting customs like the cult of the vacant throne and so forth”.

As a result of these events, some Orientalists attempted to establish a clear distinction between an “extremist” political Shiaism, a “moderate” religious Shiaism and an “intermediate” Shiaism. This latter, which shares both political and religious aspects, is at times “extremist” and at others “moderate” according to Bausani’s definition of Twelver Shiaism. It comes as no surprise that, centuries after the birth of Shiaism, Orientalists seeking support for the “democratic” orientation of Abu Bakr would use this inappropriate division to supposedly distinguish between a political Shiaism and a religious Shiaism.

The origins and early development of Shia Islam is, to a great extent, a history of divisions, dissensions and internal quarrels relating to the problem of succession. A considerable number of movements, some of which went from partial or relative dissidence to outright rupture [split], were drawn into the center of this great storm as a result of the violence of the political and religious authorities. It must be mentioned, however, that while some of these groups may have reached the state of sects in the Christian sense of the world, in our view, even this barrier between differences does not produce clear-cut division. On the contrary, under this umbrella, many branches flourished, some longer-lived than others, which developed alongside Shiaism without breaking the tie, as weak as it may have been, with the Islamic trunk from which they were born.

In truth, the development of sects, that is, groups which diverge on the basis of important beliefs or practices, is the result of the closer ties established between Shiaism and the surrounding esoteric traditions. The divergence and conflict between the distinct groups is related to the reaction towards an ocean of doctrinal wealth. The Ismailis, for example, have a doctrine which, in many respects, makes them the inheritors of the Sabaean tradition of Harran which, as is known, was the depository of the Hermetic and neo-Pythagorean doctrines, which were combined with elements from Hindu occultism and Gnosis. These Sabaeans must not be confused with the Sabaeans or Mandaeans from southern of Irak and Persia.

One of the common mistakes made in relation to Shia Islam is the attempt to compare it with the various schisms found in Christianity. Shiaism is often portrayed as a schismatic coextension of dissident groups organized in small cells or brotherhoods driven by an uncompromising parochial spirit. The concept of division in the Islamic religion must not be confused with that of fitnah, definitive division and irreparable rupture. In fact, Shiaism suffered no “division” or rupture during the Imamate of the first three Imams: Ali, Hasan and Husayn.

After the death of Husayn, however, the majority of Shias placed their trust in Zainalabidin, while a minority, known as al-Kaysaniyyah, believed that the right to succession belonged to Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah. He was the third son of Ali, but not through Fatima. As a result, he cannot be considered a descendant of the Prophet.

[ Note: He was the fruit of the marriage between the Imam and a woman from the Hanafi tribe, rather than from the Prophet’s daughter.]

Despite this fact, Muhammad ibn Hanafiyyah was proclaimed by his partisans as the Fourth Imam and the promised Mahdi. During the time he sought refuge in the mountains of Rawdah which form a cordillera in Madinah, Mukhtar al-Thaqifi served as his “representative.”

It was believed that Muhammad ibn Hanafiyyah would come down one day and appear as the Rightly-Guided and Long-Awaited Messiah. In accordance with Shia thought, the Mahdi is a man motivated by God who is also a military chief and a warrior. Even if the followers of Mukhtar al-Thaqifi gave an extremist character to the eschatological idea of the Hidden Imam, the Islamic figure of the Messiah as restorer of revealed religion is not an invention of Mukhtar or a Christian influence. The Mahdi is a spiritual synthesis of all revealed forms and not a mere uniform syncretism. It is a concept that is expressed in all its dimensions and depth in many sayings of the Prophet as well as many traditions of the Imams.

In synthesis, we can say that after the death of Imam Zainalabidin, the majority of Shias accepted Muhammad al-Baqir as the Fifth Imam, despite the fact that a minority followed his brother Zayd al-Shahid, who were known from that moment on as Zaydis. Imam Muhammad al-Baqir was succeeded by his son Jafar al-Sadiq the Sixth Imam and, after his death, his son Musa al-Kadim was recognized as the Seventh Imam.

Nevertheless, an opposition group insisted that the successor of the Sixth Imam was his elder son Ismail who had died when his father was still alive. This group split from the Shia majority and became known as the Ismailis. Others, instead, preferred Abdullah al-Aftah and some even chose Muhammad, both sons of the Sixth Imam. Still, there were even those who considered Jafar al-Sadiq as the Last Imam and were convinced that none would succeed him. Likewise, after the martyrdom of Imam Musa al-Kadim, the majority followed his son Ali al-Rida as the Eighth Imam. But there were those who refused to recognize any Imam after al-Kadim and came to constitute the brotherhood of the Waqifiyyah. From the Eighth to the Twelfth Imam, considered by the Shia majority as the Awaited Mahdi, no important division took place within Shiaism.

However it occured, what is important to retain here is that, since its origins, Shia Islam represents, more than a spiritual and political rebellion against illegitimate authority, a movement of “awakening,” like that of Sufism in the Sunni world. It was not a reformist movement in the Christian sense, like the one that took place in Europe during the 15th and 16th centuries. Shia Islam represents an integral restoration of Muhammadan theosophy and metaphysics through the application and practice of all the teachings of the Holy Imams, who linked the outer meanings of the text to the inner meanings of the divine word.

The root cause for the development of Shiaism is utterly alien from worldly affairs. The source of Shiaism is not a simple heresy or a political disagreement. Shia Islam springs from a metaphysical reality, a process of epiphany which establishes a new logophonic manifestation of prophethood. Shiaism, as the Islam of Ali and the ahl al-bayt, is the temporal and earthly pillar of the eternal and celestial reality of the wilayah. The wilayah, the spiritual guidance of the Imams, is a manifestation of prophethood. The wilayah is an inner or occult reality which is found in potential and action within the same prophethood. The wilayah is a manifestation of prophethood that is revealed in a new way. The wilayah is not the renovation of the anterior Quranic revelation but its closure.

The wilayah is an unveiling of the esoteric and metaphysical truths found in the Quran. While the Prophet sealed the age of formal revelation, by means of the divine concession of the wilayah and the Imamate to his descendants, a new age of profound “revelations” was opened. Just as the plerema of the Twelve Imams represents the fullness of the Muhammadan Reality, their teachings and doctrines are flashes from the sole Muhammadan Light, the logophonic effusions and manifestations of the Quranic revelation: its perfect synthesis and exact formulation.

Finally, in order for there to be a living branch from the Islamic trunk, a favorable doctrinal terrain was required, a spiritual identity with its own characteristics which were qualitatively different from the other ideological options of its age. With such an understanding, the historical appearance of Shiaism seems to be completely inevitable. Without its presence, of course, the history of Islam and the world would have totally changed. In our judgment, any attempt to reduce the historical development of Shiaism to a mere political problem related to the succession or to some insurgent elements is misguided at best. This applies to figures as fictitious as ‘Abdullah ibn Saba, the Yemenite of Jewish extraction, and as real and historical as Mukhtar al-Thaqifi.

Abdullah ibn Saba and Mukhtar al-Thaqifi are presented by Alessandro Bausani as “extremists” and precursors of a political Shiaism. Muslim and non-Muslim specialists have long disputed which one deserves the inappropriate title of “founder of Shia Islam.”

The Italian Orientalist briefly refers to Abdullah ibn Saba as an exalted personality, an ex-Jewish Yemenite who deified Ali during his lifetime. The feeble historical foundation surrounding someone considered to be no less than the “founder of Shia Islam” should have led Bausani and other contemporary Orientalists to infer that they were dealing with a fictitious character or an insignificant individual whose existence had not even been faithfully documented by the annals of time.

It is shocking to learn, nonetheless, that the refusal to recognize Shiaism as a historical and meta-historical reality profoundly rooted since the dawn of Islam has led certain Orientalists to discard the strongest evidence in favor of the weakest. In reality, Abdullah ibn Saba is a literary character, a fabrication of Sayf ibn Umar al-Zindiq [the Atheist or Dualist], a famous falsifier of ahadith or prophetic traditions. The absence of any convincing evidence to support the existence of Abdullah ibn Saba, partnered with the constantly contradictory and nebulous character of his life convinced some Shia scholars long ago that they were facing the figure of an imposter.

Despite this body of bona fide doubts, it took longer than expected for this fact to be confirmed. In fact, it took no less than one thousand years before a perspicacious research scholar, the erudite Shia Allamah Sayyid Murtada Askari, shed light on this somber subject. For many centuries, the detractors of Shiaism used the tale of Abdullah ibn Saba as a pretext to deny its purely Islamic origin and to corrupt its genuine Muhammadan connection. They have stubbornly presented Shiaism as the creation of an ex-Jew, thence as the political scheme of an upstart Muslim convert. As a result, the figure of the “convert” in the Muslim world continues to be the center around which all suspicions converge, whether reasonable or groundless.

Along with Abdullah ibn Saba, Mukhtar al-Thaqifi is often cited as one of the persons directly responsible for the creation of Shiaism. He appeared as the inspiration for an armed resistance that took place in the year 40 of the Hijrah, during the regime of Muawiyyah. The revolutionary movement was directed against the Caliph and the powerful governors of the Ummayad clan who were all considered, without exception, as preachers of moral perdition and religious innovation. During the period of the first three Rightly-Guided Caliphs - Abu Bakr, Umar ibn al-Khattab and Uthman - between the years 632 and 656, Ali and his followers were subjected to a considerable degree of political coercion which relaxed temporarily when Ali acceded to the Caliphate. After the death of Ali, however, the persecution of the Shias became increasingly intense and intolerable under the Ummayad regime.

With the proclamation of Muawiyyah as the Caliph in Jerusalem in the year 660, the Caliphate was moved to Damascus and acquired an entirely different character than the one it possessed during the rule of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs. The defining characteristics of Muawiyyah rule were nepotism and tyranny. The Caliph turned into a “king” who governed as an absolute sovereign in the manner of the Persian and Byzantine emperors. With the death of Muawiyyah, he was succeeded by his son Yazi [680-683], described by historians as a degenerate drunkard. Successive uprisings against him broke out through all of Arabia, inspired and encouraged by the Shias who despised the moral and spiritual decadence of the Ummayads. The Shia revolts multiplied throughout the Ummayad Caliphate. The political reaction and righteous revenge for the death of Husayn, the youngest son of Ali and Fatima, occurred in Karbala during the reign of Yazid. The revolution was led on behalf of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah, whom we have already mentioned, and its goal was accomplished by Mukhtar al-Thaqifi of Kufa in the year 685. It was in Kufa, one of the holiest cities in Islam, that the various esoteric and political branches of Shiaism appeared. Fond of the old Christianizing formula of the Orientalists, Hitti affirms that “the blood of Husayn, and the blood of his father, was the seed of the Shia Church.”

The unequal efforts of the distinct Shia groups against the Ummayad regime, each distinct in nature, meaning, purpose and reach, definitively did nothing but lead the insurgents to disaster, to merciless, heartless and relentless repression and to brutal martyrdom. But, despite these vagaries, they are not movements undeserving of attention. They have their place, which is not at all negligible, in the course of the historical evolution of the Shiaism we attempt to trace. In short, Mukhtar al-Thaqifi lived in a period of difficult transition in the history of Shiaism. As we have mentioned, it was to a great extent a time of violent dissent and disputes. Bribery and political crimes were routinely used by the Ummayad regime to suppress its opponents. As a result, the division of Shia Islam into distinct parties or factions, each one following Ali and some of his descendants, became an instrument of political struggle and the sole means of liberation and hope for the oppressed.

It was then, during those dark days of despotism, that Mukhtar al-Thaqifi appeared on the scene, transforming himself into one of the most active combatants and one of the most outstanding and ingenious revolutionaries of his time. It goes without saying that Mukhtar al-Thaqifi was Shia, and probably forcibly so. In the religious and social framework of his time, he was also a messianic revolutionary, illuminated by Gnostic ideas. In line with the goals and aspirations of his political program, he accomplished his mission to kill Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyyad and, in so doing, he avenged the death of the Third Imam, Husayn al-Sibt al-Asghar, the youngest grandson of the Prophet. The personality and character of Mukhtar al-Thaqifi aroused a great deal of controversy in the early history of Shia Islam. Some sources present him as an ambitious adventurer and a faithful follower of the political authority of ahl al-bayt. For others, he was an enlightened being who was almost raised to the rank of a prophet by his contemporaries. Although he never made such a claim himself, he did indicate directly and indirectly, as we will see shortly, that his actions were inspired by the angel of revelation.

After overcoming some initial hurdles, Mukhtar’s personal success was great and long-lasting. He finished his days with praise and acclaim, recognized as one of the bravest heroes and one of the most efficient military leaders of Shiaism. He was the implacable avenger of Husayn, the standard of the penitents, who consolidated the aspirations of this revolutionary Shia movement whose appearance was motivated by the tragedy of Karbala. The tawwabun or penitents constituted the first avenging movement of Karbala. However, as soon as Mukhtar al-Thaqifi appeared on the scene, the penitents were assimilated, and perhaps rightfully so, into his brand of revolutionary messianism.

Regardless of the reason behind Mukhtar’s popularity, the question of his religious commitment coincides with the establishment of an initiatory hierarchy which is distinct from the Shia structure. Since Shia thought was already sufficiently delineated, we must say without hesitation that his divergent approach did not arouse much sympathy among the Shias. The cause for such aversion is to be found in an accidental slip related to Imam Hasan. During his conflict with Muawiyyah, the Imam sought asylum in Madain, in the house of the governor Saad ibn Masud who was Mukhtar’s uncle. Unexpectedly and unexplicably, Mukhtar suggested to his uncle that he should turn in Imam Hasan to the Umayyad Caliph, who was searching for him. He told his uncle that he could subjugate the deposed Caliph and declare that “The treaty made with Hasan is null and void. It is under my feet.”

Obviously, the governor emphatically rejected the treacherous suggestion made by his nephew. From this incident, we can only lament Mukhtar’s political blunder which did not go unnoticed by the Shias. They unanimously and severely reproached him for being so inconsiderate and disloyal towards the first son of Ali and the oldest grandson of the Prophet. Further on, in an isolated and equally accidental incident, he regained the confidence and the appreciation of the Shias. This occurred when he refused to appear before Ziyyad ibn Abih, the Governor of Kufa, to testify against Hujr ibn Adi, the leader of the one of the Shia rebellions to overthrow the tyrant. It seems that, from that moment onwards, Mukhtar adopted a position that was increasingly favorable towards the Shia cause.

At the same time, his revolutionary rhetoric acquired an undeniable messianic character which occasionally resembled revelation. Mukhtar was a man who possessed psychological qualities in line with his strong and unusually esoteric religious mentality. He quickly converted himself into a spontaneous orator. His rhetoric was smooth and eloquent. It overflowed with obscure reflections and periphrastic expressions, which gave it a poetic flow which superficially resembled the revealed word. His speeches gave the impression that they came from an inspired source. It was for this reason that Mukhtar often alleged that his spirit was illuminated by Gabriel, the Angel of Revelation, who in an ineffable and mysterious way warned him of the unexpected.

Mukhtar’s ingenious rhetorical slips has a tremendous influence on his followers and convinced them of the appearance of the Awaited Mahdi, identified with Muhammad ibn Hanafiyyah, who was coming to restore order and justice. Due to this deep-rooted Shia conviction, he was considered by his followers as the “Representative of the Mahdi,” namely, a delegate of the third son of Imam Ali. This is the manner in which he was recognized and allowed himself to be addressed. In the years 685 and 686, he established a Shia-oriented government in Kufa. This was the first time this was done since the time of Imam Ali when he finally received his much delayed turn to occupy the Caliphate and to fully assume the supreme role he had inherited from the Prophet.

It must be remembered, however, that similar excesses on the part of Mukhtar caused, if not serious religious worries, at least considerable annoyance to the ruling religious authorities. His influence was great in the genesis of one sect, the Mukhtariyyah, but did not shake the foundation of Imami Gnosis. Although Mukhtar’s ideas were not free from doctrinal errors, they did not radically alter the esoteric concept of the Hidden Imam which is the real touchstone of all Shia thought: past, present and future. The repercussion of his ideas was sufficient to inspire the partial development of an erroneous path which, in its true sense, was nothing more than a stubbornness to maintain ideas which were contrary to those espoused by the majority of Shias.

In fairness, the interesting and eventful life of this unique man brought him the opportunity to regain the sympathy of the Shias.

As we have said, avenging the death of Husayn, the martyr of Karbala, was the mission that was thrust upon Mukhtar al-Thaqifi, as well as Sulayman ibn Surad, leader of the tawwabun. The target of this vengeance was Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyyad, considered unanimously among Shias to be the direct instigator and the main executor in the death of Imam Husayn and his family. And here is one of those interesting facts that mark the lives of the chosen ones; the martyr Maytham al-Tammar, one of the closest companions of Imam Ali and one of the saints of Islam who is highly venerated by Sufis, was imprisoned as a political prisoner by Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyyad on charges of conspiring against the Ummayad regime. Destiny would have it that Mukhtar was also in the same prison. It is there that Maytham predicted that, once he was released, he would fulfill his mission of avenging Husayn which is, after all, exactly what happened.

We have focused our attention on Mukhtar for the purpose of clearing up some common confusion related to the creation of the Party of Ali. We wish to take advantage of this opportunity to clarify another error. Bausani says that Mukhtar took over Kufa and preached messianic doctrines and starting diverting customs like the cult of the vacant throne. While this is the truth, it is not the complete truth. As “interesting” as this custom may be to Bausani--perhaps due to its symbolism--we must point out that Mukhtar never introduced “a cult of the vacant throne.” As Dozy explains, the idea of the throne was simply an ingenious ruse that this clever and brilliant strategist contrived to incite his army to battle. He had the idea of purchasing an old armchair that he had re-upholstered with a fine and expensive silk, converting it into the famous “vacant throne” of Ali. This unusual inducement brought forth its desired fruit. Ibrahim, the commander of Mukhtar’s troops, fought in an unusually brave and heroic fashion and killed Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyyad with his own sword. In the minds of the Shia soldiers the supposed throne of Ali truly acquired a highly symbolic value. Mukhtar had told them at the beginning of the battle that the throne would represent for them what the Ark of the Covenant represented to the Children of Israel.

As serious as the political events that coincide with the start of Shiaism were, they cannot be considered a sufficient reason for its historical appearance. It is certain that Abu Bakr’s assumption of the Caliphate of the Islamic Community instead of Ali, the coerced resignation of Hasan and the martyrdom of Husayn, the division of the Islamic world into various groups as a result of the bloody raids and forays of Muawiyyah and Yazid--the founders of the Ummayad dynasty--forced Muslims, Gnostics included, to take sides. However, the reason for which they were fighting goes well beyond what today is qualified as “political.”

What we mean is that not all of the political insurrections which took place in the name of Shiaism reflected the complex reality of the Imamate and what it represents metaphysically. Likewise, the development of the esoteric doctrine and thought of Shiaism in Islam should not be linked to the appearance of the word “Shia” or “Shiaism.” These terms simply designate a particular “party” or a “group” of Muslims. As Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr observes, one thing is the meaning of the term and the other is the distinct doctrine it designates. To say that the Shias are a “party” of legitimistic minority Muslims merely expresses one aspect of the term.

In the time of the Prophet, as can be seen in many ahadith, there are references to the “Shia of Ali” and the “Shia of Ahl al-Bayt” In Arabic, Shia means “partisans,” “adepts,” or “followers” of someone. As a result, it is said that Shias are those who are partisans of Imam Ali and his descendants. They are those who consider that the fulfillment of the sunnah of the Prophet demands the complete and obligatory observance of all of its dispositions and rulings. This evidently, and most importantly, includes the designation [nass] made by the Prophet of Imam Ali as his successor [khalifah].

The Caliphate at a Crossroads: Abu Bakr and the Collusion of the Powerful Classes

The afternoon of the 28th of Safar of the year 11 A.H., which corresponds to May 25th of the year 632 A.D., is marked with indelible precision in Islamic history. With the flow of time, this event and those which followed it led to a radical political change in the socio-religious orientation of the Muslim world. It is the ill-fated day of the demise of the Prophet Muhammad, the date of the closing of the “cycle of prophethood” and, simultaneously and successively, the opening of the “cycle of initiation” or the “esoteric cycle of the Imams”. The passing away of the Prophet constitutes the most tragic moment in which two distinct conceptions of authority and power confront themselves. The first was motivated by “eternal interests” and wanted to follow the straight path, shown by the final mandate of God and His Messenger, to its end.

The second was embroiled in an intricate web of “personal interests,” seeking social benefits and political privilege in which Islam, evidently, occupied a subaltern role. This later group represented the mentality of a segment of early Muslims who were unable to replace the ties of blood with the ties of faith.

Historians explain that the death of the Prophet and the issue of his succession led to plots, intrigues, alliances, underground opposition and corrupt forms of collusions. According to these academics, they were all provoked by the powerful representatives of the dominant class whose differences with Ali were motivated by political ambition from the very beginning. This interpretation, however, is far too simplistic when we consider the rivalry between the two factions, the emigrants and the allies. The first, long accustomed to strong tribal authority, treaties, and blood-ties, wanted to maintain some of the political privileges and ancient social considerations abolished by Islam. They wanted to take advantage of the Prophet’s death to reclaim power by appointing a Caliph who would be loyal to them: Abu Bakr.

The appointment of Ali as successor, however, came from a divine mandate. Unlike the opportunistic and orchestrated election of Abu Bakr, Ali’s investiture was rooted in the historical event of Ghadir. In the 11th year of the Hijrah, the Prophet made a solemn pilgrimage to Makkah, known as the Farewell Pilgrimage. During his return, he stopped at the pond of Ghadir Khumm in front of 120,000 Muslims. Shia commentators point to the event of Ghadir as the definitive proof, not only of the fulfilment of the Prophet’s mission, but of God’s permanent commitment to the preservation of Islam by the concession of a wilayah to His Final Messenger. The perfection and completion of Islam was conditioned and dependent on the designation of the Prophet’s successor for, as we read in the Quran [4:3], the Messenger and the guidance go hand and hand. As a result, both the Prophethood and the Imamate must follow the same path.

Zayd ibn al-Arqam relates that “the first to visit and congratulate Ali were Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, Uthman, Talhah and Zubayr: the congratulations and the oaths of loyalty continued until sunset . What stands out from this and other trustworthy and authentic Sunni traditions is that when the Prophet publicly appointed Ali as his successor and executor, placing his wilayah in his descendants, neither Abu Bakr nor Umar ibn al-Khattab, who ended up preceding Ali in the succession of the historical Caliphate, contested the matter nor did they have the audacity to claim any special rights. Abu Bakr never insisted upon his superiority over Ali.

He never claimed to have more right to rule over the Muslims and for them to obey him. To be precise, the event that unleashed an endless series of internal division, known by Arab historians as the insubordination or sedition [fitnah], came quite unexpectedly. It coincides with Abu Bakr, the son of Abu Quhafah, being illegitimately appointed as the successor of the Prophet. His appointment took place through the collusion of powerful interests. It was they who granted him the leadership of the Islamic community by means of a pre-Islamic consultative assembly.


[ Note: Shura is a pre-Islamic custom in which elections and votes alternate giving place to a succession of consultative councils. These consultative councils became increasingly narrow until they reached the tribal leader, the living executive chief. The only thing that limited his exercise of absolutist power was the enormous coercion to which he was subjected. Although shura was the method in which pre-Islamic Arabic tribes selected leaders and made major decisions, some of the Companions pointed to the following Quranic verses as an endorsement for its use in selecting the Caliph: “So pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult with them [the believers] upon the conduct of affairs” (3:159) and “those who conduct their affairs by counsel [are praised]” (43:38). According to Shia scholars these verses do not refer to the appointment of the Caliph or the Imam, something which was divinely decreed.]


When commenting on this practice, Modernist Sunni scholars commonly claim that Abu Bakr was recognized as Caliph through a “democratic” election, based on the decision and consensus of a majority. This gives the false impression that this ancient form of consultation is comparable to the modern democratic systems found in the Western world. It must be recalled, though, that the people did not participate in this elective act in the political sense that we understand it today. Quite the opposite was true. The people were completely excluded from the process, including Ali, his Family and the closest Companions of the Prophet. The Shurah that was convoked in Saqifah was limited to the council of tribal chiefs exclusively composed of the dominant classes who were open and organized enemies of Ali.

As a result, the Islamic Caliphate, the first de facto Islamic government, by far the highest and most important religious and political institution in the Sunni world, begins when Abu Bakr decides to take personal power. As Caliph, Abu Bakr assumes the role of leading and governing the rest of Muslims in accord with a sovereign authority and jurisdiction which, until the time of the Prophet’s death, was expressed in his culmination of the prophethood. While the Prophet lived, the Caliphate was, in the person of Muhammad, a holy and indivisible entity. After his death, though, ambitions became impatient. The result was the rupture of what, by divine design, was inseparable, the prophethood and the wilayah, the Caliphate and the Imamate, which were meant to go hand in hand, since there can never be one without the other. It was for this reason that the Prophet said in the Tradition of Ghadir, “to whomsoever I was the lord and master Ali is your lord and master.”

The initiatory role and function of the Caliphate and the Imamate are the same. They are characteristic of the spiritual authority and the temporal power of the Imam. They are non-transferable and cannot be subjected to the ballot box. When we say that the functions of the Imam are “non-transferable” we specifically mean that these powers and functions are not at the reach of unqualified individuals. Spiritual and political leadership is not available to all. They cannot be seized by force or by consensus. The powers in question are exclusive.

They are superior by their very nature. They are divine by origin and not by artifice. The Imamate requires an individual with exceptional perfection and cannot be shared with all individuals.

Abu Bakr’s attitude and actions forever destroyed the esoteric foundation of the succession of the Prophet. Concerned more with justifying his own personal superiority, he constantly stressed that consensus was indispensable when it came to continuing the exoteric work of the Prophet. This is the reason why, according to some later Sunni commentaries, it is often asserted that Abu Bakr was selected Caliph because the Prophet had not clearly designated a successor.

The truth, however, is altogether different. Although some Sunni scholars admit that the most important traditional sources contain numerous testimonies that manifest, with great clarity, the legitimate rights of succession of Ali, they insist, nonetheless, that the Prophet may very well have changed his mind at the last minute and finally decided to place Abu Bakr in the place of Ali. We must remember that, according to the clearest and most unanimous accounts, there is no indication whatsoever that the Prophet changed his mind regarding Ali or did anything to retract his previous decision, annulling, cancelling, or removing his primary rank as a member of the Prophetic Household. If he had changed his mind, he would have made it known publicly in front of all Muslims with the same clarity and precision that he had used previously to proclaim Ali as the head of the community at Ghadir Khumm.

It was well-known by all Muslims of the time that the Prophet never acted out of haste. His decisions were well meditated upon. What certain Sunni commentators seem to forget, or fail to take into consideration, is the consequence of the ultimate mandate of God to His Messenger in the moment that the following verse was revealed: “And today I have perfected your religion and have chosen Islam as your religion.” [4:3].

If some Sunni commentators defend the superiority of Abu Bakr because he was respected by some of the Prophet’s Companions; on the other hand, there are numerous clear accounts concerning the superiority of Ali. Any educated individual, who objectively examines the circumstances surrounding the death of the Prophet, can only conclude that Ali was the victim of a political plot. He was the victim of a conspiracy aimed at denying him the legitimate exercise of his political functions as Spiritual Magistrate as Caliph and Imam. In this light, is it not significant that Abu Bakr changed the name of his post, calling himself “Caliph”--in the sense of “substitute” and not “successor”--as opposed to Imam?

On the basis of the aformentioned, we cannot come to a favorable conclusion to support the superiority of Abu Bakr. If we stick objectively to the reports found in traditional primary sources, we must address the metaphysical and esoteric reasons for Ali’s appointment as the successor of the Prophet. It was at Ghadir Khumm were Muhammad transmitted his wilayah [guardianship] as an exoteric personification of temporal power and a representation of the esoteric unity and universality of the spiritual authority. Certain Orientalists, who focus exclusively on superficial interpretations, may indeed admit the superiority of Ali. However, they view the whole question as a political dispute among two factions struggling for the succession of the Prophet which resulted in the victory of Abu Bakr. Similarly, when studying the Prophetic Traditions, many Sunni commentators deny or fail to recognise the status of Ali and his Imamate as a continuation of the personal primacy of the Prophet.

The same selective blindness regarding the status of Ali, however, does not occur among Sufi sages. In Sufism, one aspect does not exclude the other. As a result, both exoterically and esoterically, Abu Bakr and Ali can be seen as the pillars of Islam. For Sufism, Ali, as founder of the founder of the wilayah [guardianship], legatee and living preserver, present at all times, continues to be the spiritual foundation of Islamic gnosis due to his innate dignity and power as the Pole of the Spiritual Poles. Abu Bakr, on the other hand, is the visible foundation of the religion due to the powers that were conferred upon him through the consensus of the Companions. For Sufism, they both fulfil this function simultaneously: both Abu Bakr and Ali are the pillars of the religion in its external and formal manifestations. The interesting thing, however, is that for the Sufis, the First Imam of the Shias is the Pillar of all Pillars, even of Abu Bakr, in the sense that upon the death of the Prophet he assumed all of his functions and prerogatives.

Sufism, as is well known, contains formulations that are more esoteric than exoteric. It should not be overlooked that the very establishment of Sufism in the Sunni world is the result of the unbalancing action caused by Abu Bakr when he split the exoteric from the esoteric by assuming the leadership of the Muslim community. Even though Sufism and Shiaism are entirely orthodox expressions of Islam, Sunnis have always viewed them with extreme suspicion due to their constant reference to Ali as “the gate” to Muhammadan gnosis and initiation. According to the exoteric exegesis of some Sunni scholars, the Prophet is also a Legislator, since in Islam the sacred law permeates all aspects of religious and social life. For Sunni scholars, the Caliph or Imam is the Successor of the Prophet, but only as a partial executor of the Law as given and is in no way a spiritual successor of the Prophet.

Sunni theologians justify the historical need for the Caliphate, as an institution, from the point of view that one of the objectives of the Prophet was the creation of a strong organized Islamic State. For Sunnis, the Imam or Caliph must possess the following qualities: belong to the tribe of Quraysh, be competent and capable, possess knowledge and virtue; be worthy of ruling men and guide them along the straight moral and religious path through the rigorous application of the formal divine laws. He may be named directly by the Prophet or the preceding Caliph or by means of “election,” namely, through designation by the elders of the community.

# Prophecy and Imamate: Two Inseparable Metaphysical Realities

For Sunni Muslims, the legitimacy of the Caliphate is an issue of secondary or relative importance. According to Sunni thought, even an illegitimate Caliph is acceptable as long as he has sufficient strength and ability to resolve the socio-economic problems of the society. It is easily understood how individuals with stubborn tribal mentalities and notions of superiority could perceive the Caliphate as being the pinnacle of Arabism. Even the trials and tribulations they suffered due to their loyalty to Islam and the Prophet could not make them forget their prior status as oligarchic tribal chiefs. It is therefore not surprising that the election of Abu Bakr as Caliph was based on pre-Islamic tribal customs. The Caliphate allowed the tribal chiefs to satisfy their nostalgia for the Old Order by giving the emerging system, despite its radical transformation, traits of political and economic centralism which has been abolished by Islam.

Abu Bakr assumed the Caliphate, not through the legitimacy of his aspiration, but through the complicity of his peers from the tribe of Quraysh. He gained the unanimous support of the leaders of his tribe and manoeuvred himself into power at a time when differences in opinion and division of loyalties prevailed.

History will never understand the cause of such a phenomenon without considering the rivalry between the Quraysh and the non-Quraysh and the Emigrants and the Allies. Without such an understanding, any explication of the development of Shiaism would be nothing but a deceitful distortion. Was not the rise of Shiaism the case of a revolt of the new over the old established order? Indeed it was. The political and economic centralism of the elders of Quraysh from the days of ignorance was not extinguished with the arrival of Islam. The partisans of the old order mobilized against the new Islamic order established by Muhammad and embodied by Ali. The Quraysh defended the old order with the same drive and determination they demonstrated during the lifetime of the Prophet when the Makkan oligarchy had resisted with all their strength against Muhammad’s divine and revealed message. The ruling classes were particularly disturbed by the fact that, from the very beginning of his mission, the Messenger of Allah had rejected concepts such as social superiority, pride in ancestry and Arabism. Muhammad viewed himself, first and foremost, as an “admonisher” and a “guardian” of his people rather than its “king”. As he put it himself, “Surely I am not a king… I am but the son of a woman who ate dried meat” (Tirmidhi). And to the scandal of the Meccan oligarchy, he abolished all distinction between race and class with the decisive declaration that: “All human beings are equal like the teeth of a comb. There is no superiority of an Arab over a non Arab, of a non-Arab over an Arab, of a white man over a black man or of a male over a female. The only merit in God’s estimation is righteousness.”

In truth, the Prophet never manifested in any of his sayings that belonging to the tribe of Quraysh or social status were necessary conditions for being elected Imam or Caliph. Abu Bakr, on the other hand, always maintained, in accord with his background, that the right to the Caliphate belonged to the members of the tribe of Quraysh by the simple fact that they were descendants of “the most honorable Arabs.”

Whoever examines the Islamic accounts of the period will notice with great surprise that the Muslim sector at Saqifah proclaimed Abu Bakr as the First Caliph soon lost the esoteric and spiritual significance of the Imamate or the Caliphate, if they ever possessed it at all. For them, as we have said, spiritual authority and temporal power were united in the person of Muhammad by the fact that he was the Messenger of God and the Intercessor between God and man. When it came to Imam Ali, he was viewed by the old oligarchy, in the best of cases, as merely a half-Muhammad, blessed with an inspired character and the spiritual wisdom of a prophet. They did not, however, consider him fit to assume the functions of legal administrator and political leader. For the Followers of Ali, among whom were the closest and most famous companions of the Prophet, this separation between spiritual authority and temporal power was intolerable. It was not so much the political Imamate that Ali inherited from Muhammad which drew the Shia. Rather, it was the esoteric sense of the prophethood that continued to pulse within him: Imamate was the amplification of prophethood, a more interiorized complement.

According to Shia thought, divine guidance takes two forms: Prophethood. The first is co-substantial to the “Muhammadan Truth”, in an absolute, integral, primordial, pre-eternal and post-eternal sense. The second is constituted by the partial realities of the first: its emissions and luminous epiphanies; in other words, the Imams of the Prophetic Household who initiated and continued the “cycle of initiation” that was sealed by the Prophet and which, like his luminaries, are identified with the pleroma of the “Light of Light” of the “Muhammadan Light”. From this metaphysical point of view, the Twelve Imams belong, in their condition of luminous epiphanies of “Muhammadan Light,” to the same spiritual and temporal category as the Prophet without them been truly and properly prophets. This notion is repeated in many traditions in relation to Ali, like the one which says “You are to me as Aaron was to Moses except there will be no prophet after me” (Bukhari, Muslim, Hakim, Sadduq, Mufid, Kulayni).

The bond that exists between Muhammad and Ali goes far beyond that of blood. What exists between them is a special spiritual tie which surpasses the relation of impossibility that “there will be no prophet after me.” The bond between Muhammad and Ali is the result of their common pre-existence in eternity where they were two spiritual entities united in the same luminous identity. As Prophet has explained in various sayings, “Ali and I are from the same Light”. “People are from various trees, but Ali and I are from the same Tree”. The eminence and spiritual supremacy of the First Imam is also established in the significant tradition in which the Prophet states: “Ali has been sent secretly with every Prophet; but with me he has been sent openly”. It can also be seen in the tradition which states that: “Every prophet has an executor and a successor and surely my executor and successor is Ali”. There is also the tradition that “Ali is part of me and I am part of Ali and nobody acts on my behalf except Ali”. In a passage from the well-known tradition of Ghadir, delivered shortly before the Prophet’s death, Ali successorship is once again confirmed: “Oh People!” said the Prophet, “Allah granted me the wilayah [guardianship], placing me above all believers. To whom I have been the protector, Ali is also his protector.”

In relation to this Shia doctrine of the “Muhammadan Light” there is a saying from the Prophet which affirms he and Ali are two identical and pre-existing lights that God manifested separately and simultaneously during the “reign” of Adam and in the hidden worlds. After having passed from one “reign” to another they were finally placed in the persons of Hasan and Husayn who were, simultaneously, two luminous epiphanies that emanated from the “Primordial Light” through which the “Lord of the Worlds” illuminated all of creation through the “light of the logos” or initial fiat lux. This “primordial light” protects the Prophet and the Imams from sin, making them immaculate. At the same time, it confers on them the status of supremacy of the poles of the universe and representatives of God as well as spiritual legatees of the esoteric aspects of the scripture. As the Imams have stated, “We are the first and the last. We are the logos of God. We are the executors of the revelation.” As can be seen, the parallel between Moses’ position and that which Muhammad would occupy in later times becomes evident in light of these words.

It was also at this time that the Imamate was established as part and parcel of the prophethood. The true Imam and Prophet was Muhammad; and Muhammad had a successor, his Aaron, in the person of Ali. It is for this reason that Shia Muslims consider descent from Ali to be an obligatory requirement for any candidate to the Caliphate along with the criteria considered necessary by Sunni Muslims. The Shia, however, differ with the Sunni in that they categorically reject election through consultative assembly. In their eyes, the pre-Islamic process of consultation does nothing but continue the timocratic orientation of Abu Bakr and the representatives of the old Quraysh oligarchy established in Saqifah. Since Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power come from God above, it is impossible for a man to receive the sacred investiture of Imam or khalifah through a classicist covenant or a political plot between parties. The word khalifah appears twice in the Quran. In the first case it refers to Adam [2:28]. In the second case, it refers to David [38:257] with the sense of “legislator:” “We have made you a khalifah on earth,” says God to Adam, “decide among men with justice!” For Muslims, David was both a Prophet and an Imam, combining both spiritual and political authority. The word appears several times in the Quran in the plural, khulafa and khalaif.

The plural “caliphs” appears in contexts which, in relation to the descendants of Muhammad, can be translated as “successors” and, at times, as “inheritors,” “proprietors” and even as “vicars” and “substitutes.” The Arabic word khalifah, from which the English word “caliph” is derived, comes from a root that is found in several Semitic languages. At times, it has the meaning of “to pass on” or “to transmit.” This would make the word the equivalent of the Latin word traditio and the Greek word paradosis.

In Arabic, however, the generally accepted meaning is that of “following” or “coming in place of.” By far, the most common interpretation by the majority of Sunni scholars, with the sole exception of the Sufi Masters, is that the caliph is the vicar or successor of the Prophet. The caliph is the custodian of his moral and legal inheritance as Founder of the faith and legislator for the Islamic government and community. The caliph is not, however, in the eyes of most Sunni scholars, the successor to the spiritual office of the Prophet, the executor of his esoteric interpreter of the word of God. This interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the meaning of the word wilayah which appears to indicate that the function of the Prophet was not destined to disappear after his death but rather, on the contrary, to continue by means of the spiritual authority and temporal power of the Imams until the end of times.

# The Wilayah: The Spiritual and Temporal Authority of the Imams

If we focus on the term wilayah [primacy, guide, lordship] and words related to spiritual authority and temporal power, as Ayatullah Mutahhari did in a formidable and authoritative synthesis, we note that this terminological repertoire has a very precise meaning in Shia thought which is related to the idea of a unified government. Wila, walayah, wilayah, wali, mawla, are nominal forms of the verbal substantive of the trilateral root WALLA which has the primary meaning of “being close,” from which is derived “to be at the front of,” from which is derived the meanings of “government” and “governor” in the temporal and political sense of the words and “leader” and “chosen” in the spiritual sense. The same root gives place to a series of words which denote power and authority, that is, being close to the center [wasat] of sovereignty. And the Arabic word wasat [center] gives a gamut of terms which indicate “mediation” or “intercession” [tawassut].

Other unfamiliar terms derived from the same trilateral root waw-lam-ya are wali and mawla. Wali means “friend,” “intimate,” “close,” and with the respect to the Imams “holiness” and by extension spiritual “closeness” to the divine center. The passive participle mawla means, among other things, “one who deserves a clientele,” and more frequently “boss,” “lord,” “protector,” “tutor,” “master,” “owner” and so forth.

In Shiaism, mawlana [our lord, our master] is used to address the Prophet and the Imams and, in Sufism, it is used to refer to the great spiritual masters like Rumi or Ibn al-Arabi. We have listed the various forms and verbal nouns because with the auxiliary one can better understand everything which is implied by the idea of Imamate or Caliphate and how it is conceived in Shia thought in relation to spiritual authority and temporal power. In the time of the Prophet, the title mawla [master] had the connotation of spiritual authority and universal temporal power. The basis of any Caliphate or true government is the transcendence of its foundation, the very basis of its sovereignty, authority and legitimacy. However, with the downfall of effective power in the succession of the Caliphate, starting with Abu Bakr, the title khalifah also suffered from the same process of depreciation. After the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs, the Caliphate ceased to have the connotation of sovereignty and, in fact, to admit the sense of effective authority. This can be seen clearly with Muawiyyah, the founder of the Ummayad dynasty, who considered himself the “first king” of Islam. He is responsible for losing the effective [spiritual] authority of the Caliphate and diminishing the meaning of many titles which, in the early days, were exclusive Caliphal prerogatives. This includes the very term khalif which, upon entering the common language, became so diluted that any governor of Islam could claim to be the Caliph of his own dominion.

Among some Sunni commentators and misinformed Orientalists, there are those who believe that when Ali became the Fourth Caliph, according to the temporal and political precedence more than the spiritual, he was implicitly accepting the authority and the method of election of the previous Caliphs in that they accomplished similar political and social functions as governors and elders of the Islamic community. From a Shia perspective, it is clear that Ali never accepted the Caliphate in the sense that the three Caliphs who preceded him did. On the contrary, as Imam--in the Shia sense of spiritual and political regency as well as taalim, the esoteric faculty of perfectly interpreting the intertexual mysteries of the Quran and the shariah--Ali was the legitimate spiritual heir and political successor of the Prophet, something which he and his successors always insisted upon. As he explains explicitly in his letters and sermons, Ali accepted the function of Caliph--in the Sunni sense of governor and legal administrator--to avoid schism while preserving the function of wilayah for himself. As Nasr says, this is how Ali can simultaneously be seeing as Caliph and Imam, by both Sunnis and Shias, in accord with the different perspectives on the issue [see Shi’ite Islam].

The wilayah inherently implies certain legal and political faculties. The Imam, as we have said, exercises the spiritual magistrate and the esoteric guidance of the wilayah. He also performs the function of administrator of the shariah, fully interpreting its legal code and legitimately and dispensing justice through his role as perfect monarch, by the fact that he embodies spiritual authority and temporal power. The monarch is the “supreme sovereign,” unique and universal,” and not merely a “king” since a king only administers the temporal functions of government while the monarch is the one who rules according to the monarchy of divine right, established from above, by the mandate of God and not by human choice.

As Lord Acton, a British historian of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries said, “Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” As human history has shown us, human lust for power can become exacerbated by its very existence. It can make man dream of limitless power, causing him to rebel against his plight, his powerless limited being. Justice and peace are then viewed as unacceptable unless they can help increase and maintain power and wealth. They are soon placed on the backburner due to innate egocentrism and worldly ambitions. This is why the Gospel refers to heads of nations as tyrants who rule like absolute sovereigns while the powerful ones oppress them with their power (Matthew 20:25; Mark 10:42). In a divine monarchy, based on balance, harmony, justice and peace, quite the opposite is true.

On the basis of the above, it can now be understood why in Shiaism, the sovereign authority of Imam al-Mahdi has an eminently regulating and restorative function which is proper and non-transferable. In other words, he is worthy, by divine design, of the “central” position he occupies. As an “intercessor” between heaven and earth, he is beyond the distinction between the spiritual and wordly realms of existence. The very nature of “intercessor” in the true sense of the word is quintessential to the seal of the cycle of initiation. It is for this reason that he is referred to as the “center” [wasat].

The “center” in question is the fixed point around which the world rotates. It is designated symbolically by all religious traditions as the “pole” and is generally represented by a “wheel.” The most obvious sense of this symbol is the absolute dominion over the worldly order. This is why Imam al-Mahdi receives the majestic titles of Lord of the Age, The Pillars, The Restorer], The Awaited One, The Proof as well as the Spiritual Pole of the Age.

The title of Lord of the Age, in its most sublime sense, applies exclusively to the Mahdi. He is granted this title in virtue of his role as the primordial universal legislator who formulates the most appropriate laws in accordance with the conditions during our cycle of existence. He directs the movement of our cycle without participating in it in a visible fashion. He maintains himself simultaneously present and hidden in the world, the same as in Aristotle’s notion of the “unmoving motor.”

In light of these considerations, it is understood why Imam al-Mahdi has the fundamental attributes of “Justice” and “Peace.” He shares these attributes with Cakravarti, [from the Sanskrit: “he who makes the wheel turn”], the “Universal Monarch” of the Hindu and Buddhist traditions; with Wang, the “Pontiff King” of Taoism and with melki-tsedeq, the “King of Justice and Peace” of the Jewish tradition.

The Invisible Imam’s attributes of justice and peace are veiled forms of his spiritual functions which, by an effort of cosmic unity, are identified with earthly equilibrium and harmony. In light of these concepts, we can affirm that the Shia concept of wilayah, the spiritual and temporal authority of the Imam, is the Islamic equivalent of all of these traditional notions from both East and West, including the Hellenist and Hellenist-Christian concept of the panbasileus or “Absolute King,” who was the lord of a unique and universal empire.

Imam al-Mahdi is particularly revered for his role as Executor of Prophetic Knowledge or First Intellect. At the same time, he is the Archetype of Man, the Visible and the Invisible, the First and the Last, the Alpha and the Omega. As Henry Corbin perceived from the development of Shia Prophetology, this human form in its pre-eternal glory is called Original Adam, the Perfect Man, the Supreme Spirit and Scribe, the Absolute Caliph, and the Pole of the Poles. Imam al-Mahdi is also the Eternal Muhammadan Reality, the Light of His Glory, His Sanctifying Virtue, His Primordial Logos or Divine Word and his Perfect Epiphany.

In light of the above, we can say that in the beginning of Islam, Shiaism, like Sufism, was a latent and nameless reality profoundly rooted in the esoteric dimension of the Quranic revelation. In the Islamic world, the function of Shiaism, like that of Sufism, is similar to the human heart in the sense that the heart is the vital center of the human body as well as being, in reality, the intellectual “center” of a reality that transcends any formal determination. This “central” role of Shiaism at the heart of the Islamic world has always, and continues to be, hidden from outside observers, who insist upon its non-Islamic origin. They insist on this theory because Shia doctrine does not appear in the first centuries, particularly during the life of the Prophet, with all of the metaphysical development that would manifest itself later on.

From a historical perspective, Shiaism surfaced immediately after the death of the Prophet and can be defined as “Ali’s Islam” or the “Islam of Ahl al-Bayt.” The emergence of Shiaism was not merely the consequence of a political conflict related to the succession of the Prophet, although this certainly helped to precipitate the events. What is important, above all, is the “central” role that Shiaism played in the Islamic world after the demise of the founder of Islam. As a continuation and a doctrinal complement to the Prophethood, it was imperative for the wilayah to manifest itself in the world upon the completion of the Prophetic mission.

Since wilayah implies the same possibility of prolonging the spiritual leadership and the esoteric guidance of the Prophet, it cannot be superimposed on the Prophethood as long as the Prophet was alive.

In other words, Shia Islam, which was supposed to serve as a support for the wilayah, the spiritual and esoteric dimension of the Prophethood, must manifest itself upon the death of the Prophet. This moment, both cosmologically and metaphysically, signals the start of the wilayah, the beginning of its temporal and exoteric manifestation. It is at that point when the wilayah ceases to be a latent, nameless reality, and transforms itself into a manifest and named reality. Due to its cosmological and metaphysical nature, the historical apparition of Shiaism was meant to coincide with the cycle of wilayah, the start of Ali’s earthly mission. The esoteric function of the first Imam, hidden until the moment of the Prophet’s death, was meant to manifest itself in a partial opening of the Muhammadan wilayah and the seal of the universal wilayah. We can thus fully appreciate the importance of the designation of Ali as successor and executor of the Prophet. Ali, the first link in the spiritual chain of the Imamate and the rukn or pillar of Islamic Gnosticism, represents the complementary dimension of the prophethood; his path, Shiaism, is a dimension of the depth found at the core of the Quranic message.

# The Imamate: The Esoteric Inheritance of the Prophet

To sum up the political aspects of Islamic history, it is clear that the Caliphate is transmitted by way of direct appointment [Naas] through which the Prophet or the Imam designates who will succeed him in the Imamate. The Imam is the sole expert of the inner sense of the Scripture and the Sunnah. This exclusive knowledge was passed directly from the Prophet to Ali and through him to his Descendants. The Imam is thus the definitive authority on religion obligations and the esoteric interpretation of the Islamic law. Furthermore, the Imam possesses the quality of infallibility and impeccability. The controversial and contentious issue of the succession of the Prophet, disputed by Sunnis and Shias for over a millennium, can never be understood if the essentially esoteric function of the Imamate, as a prolongation and complement to the prophethood, is overlooked. The issue of the Imamate is more than an abstract question. It is the legitimate expression of Muhammadan spiritual authority and temporal power. It is a concrete existential reality which needed to manifest itself in the world to continue expounding the esoteric aspect of the prophethood.

As Corbin senses, the concept of the Imams can only be understood if one considers them as divine luminaries and pre-cosmic entities. They themselves affirmed so during the course of their worldly existence. Many traditions to this effect were gathered by al-Kulayni in his voluminous compilation al-Kafi.

They stress the fact that the Prophet and the Imam are from the same essence and the same light and what is said of one is applicable to any one of the twelve.

Shia gnosis enables us to understand the importance of the situation and exactly what was on the line with the Caliphate. By the political substitution of Abu Bakr for Ali, the organic link between the exoteric and the esoteric was temporarily broken. In Sunnism, this led to the development of a legalistic religion, based on a purely juristic interpretation of Islam. It was thus left to Sufi and Shia Islam to preserve, in their exoteric practices and doctrines, the lost esoteric equilibrium.

# Conclusions

For the sake of concision and to avoid repeating what has already been explained, we will limit ourselves to recalling that in Shiaism, the question of the Caliphate is eminently transcendental. As such, Ali’s right to succession cannot, in any way, be subjected to human scrutiny. For Shias, the supreme spiritual status of Ali is peerless and cannot be compared to the rank held by other Islamic leaders. He belongs to a unique and superior spiritual category which was conferred on him by the grace of God. By bestowing the wilayah of the Prophet on Ali, God perfected Islam and brought the prophetic mission to a close. The fundamental doctrine of wilayah is based on the concept of the guidance of the Imams. What continues in Islam under the name of wilayah is, by fact and by right, a form of esoteric guidance from which humanity cannot stray without perishing. The wilayah is the guaranteed living embodiment of the spiritual authority of the Prophet which, by the temporal succession of the Twelve Imams, continues throughout human history until the end of times. Understandably, it is impossible to separate the historical development of Shia Islam from the meta-historical antecedents of wilayah. Ali’s Islam cannot be separated from the metaphysical truths which are its telos, its fundamental and final cause. In closing, it is inconceivable to claim that we have dealt with the issue of Imamate and wilayah in all of its depth. We have limited ourselves to addressing the issue of its origins and leaving the topic open to further research.

As a result, this study on the origins of Shiaism must remain incomplete for the time being. In order for it to be complete, it would have been necessary to compile some of the traditions that attest to the extraordinary importance of the secret spiritual life of Shiaism and the Shia ethos of the Hidden Imam, the seal of the Muhammadan wilayah, for, as the Prophet has stated, without the continuous living presence of the Imam, neither human beings nor the world can subsist. [2004]


# 2006 Addition by Professor Vittor:

The article “Shia Islam: Orthodoxy or Heterodoxy” was first published in 1994. It was written with the purpose of analyzing the various arguments and approaches employed by Western scholars and opinion-makers to characterize “Islamic fundamentalism,” an ill-defined and ill-understood social phenomena occurring in the Muslim world. The very term “fundamentalism,” as applied to Islam, is inappropriate and arbitrary, and finds its sole justification in the language of the press.

The immediate objective of the article was to explain why such a characterization of Islam was not only erroneous in application, but a serious oversimplification, a tendentious interpretation motivated by a hidden agenda. The article also sheds light on questions related to the use and abuse of certain arguments. It exposed some of the mistakes made by Orientalists and corrected, once and for all, a series of serious shortcomings. It demonstrated how well-known Arabists and Modernist Muslim thinkers repeatedly misapply various terms.

It exposed their misappropriation of Western religious terminology--filled with false assumptions and prejudices--and how they indiscriminately apply them to a wide variety of spiritual traditions. Those who profess expertise in the study and understanding of Islam and Shiaism, often without possessing even basic proficiency in Arabic and Persian, take terms from the Western world and attempt to apply them to the Eastern world. They take Christian terminology and attempt to impose it upon Islam. Not only are these technical terms misappropriated, they are applied to traditional Islamic concepts which are taken totally out of context. This common practice is as ludicrous as taking Islamic terminology and applying it to the Christian world. Some scholars could argue that the Catholics are “Shias,” followers of the “infallible” Popes.

Others would argue that the Catholics are the Sunnis, and the Catholic Church is the Caliphate. The Protestants would be labelled as “Shias,” sectarian heretics who broke from the main body of believers. Yet others would say that the Protestants are “Wahhabis” since they are literalist fundamentalists while the Catholics are “Shias” because of their hermeneutical tradition. As misguided as it may be, this practice of imposing a Western religious framework on the Islamic faith has been done with impunity so much so that authors have not even seen the need to justify their extrapolations, to confirm their correctness, or to consider their relevance.

When we first wrote the article, we focused our criticism on Western Orientalism. Now, however, we have extended our critique--and most justifiably so--to the social and political sciences in general. In recent decades, these two fields have erroneously employed certain scientific and non-scientific terms. This includes terms like “fundamentalism” which the social and political sciences apply to anything in the Islamic world which seems reactionary or conservative. In fact, the half-religious, half-political phenomenon they are observing has nothing to do with “fundamentalism.” According to its original meaning, “fundamentalism” denotes a dry literalist spirit, a concept which is completely alien to the Islamic tradition. As a result, the application of the derogatory term “fundamentalism” to Islam is a distortion of the true nature of things. It reflects an attempt to impose a label by lexical manipulation. To make matters worse, the application of the term “fundamentalism” gives a false impression of Islam to Westerners. Rather than presenting Islam as it is, they present it as it is not.

Sacred tradition--the source of all spirituality--and religion, which is its outer aspect--cannot be subjected to the same scrutiny as the pure sciences. One cannot approach a spiritual tradition like a physicist deals with gravity, a biologist deals with life, a meteorologist deals with the climate, or an entomologist deals with insects. Studying religious tradition is not the same as observing natural phenomena. For the sociologist, political scientist or philosopher, it is impossible to split religious phenomenon into bits and pieces with the same callous indifference a coroner employs to dissect a cadaver. According to Positivism, such an aloof attitude is natural and to be expected of any scientist.

While the social sciences are not pure sciences, researchers in these fields also focus on observation. Social scientists employ rigorous methods of research, documentation, and analysis when studying a social system. They use statistics to bring together all the determining factors and conditions in order to describe social change. They attempt, to the highest degree possible, to be as strict and exhaustive as physicists and biologists when dealing with human factors. This scientific spirit forms the very basis of research in the social sciences. However, unlike the pure sciences, which are based on scientific facts, the social sciences rely on human factors, information provided by people, and so-called public opinion, making them particularly susceptible to subjectivity.

From the time the original article was written, over a decade has elapsed. During that time, we have observed how English terms like “fundamentalism” and “radical Islamism,” have been consistently interchanged as if they were equivalents. These terms were treated as synonyms by specialists in Islamic Studies. They have been and continue to be used by social critics and political analysts when commenting upon foreign policy and international affairs. These spokespersons are often the initial source of public opinion. Subsequently, whether it embellishes or minimizes, public opinion is one of the greatest influences on public life in the Western world.

Considering the fact that the mass media is manipulated on a mass scale, the question begs to be asked: “Should the social sciences cast aside their objectivity and simply submit to this ‘virtual reality’ built upon falsehood and deceit?” The obvious answer is no. It should not and it must not. However, when we look at the cultural landscape in the Western world, when we read newspapers and watch television, we see that many social scientists are merely echoing false and deceitful public opinion. In fact, many of them use the same concepts and terms that social engineers use to falsify the facts. The situation has become so blurred in the social sciences that scholars need to seriously reassess their basic assumptions, academic objectives, and research tools. They need to start addressing these preoccupying epistemological problems. As Barbara Castleton explains:

“We live in an age in which a selection of a dozen or so buzz words can turn a nation from protector to aggressor. We live in an age where lies revealed bring no shame in the liar, merely a restatement of the lie in a configuration that both extends and perpetuates it. Ours is not the first era in which this has occurred. History is replete with such episodes, notably the Crusades and the Holocaust. But the direction taken by the West in its pursuit of “terrorists,” and in America’s attempts to “protect the homeland” from said “terrorists” through a “war on terror” has ceased to have any meaning beyond the utterance of the words themselves.”

As we have seen, the mass media is responsible for spreading falsehood and legitimizing slanderous and scientifically inaccurate terms like “fundamentalism,” and “radical Islamism.” This does not mean that the mass media is the mother of all evil--quite the contrary--it is the very concept of secular modernity and globalization, the “progressive” anti-traditional attitude of modern man which poses the greatest threat to humanity. From the time concepts like secularism and Positivism first emerged in the West, the world has been transformed into a “global village”. It is not the mass media, then, which is the cause of certain aberrations of interpretation which offend the good sense of any critic. It is part and parcel of the Western worldview. As for us, we will continue to criticize social scientists and philosophers for converting “opinion” into “fact.” While we risk sounding like a “fundamentalist,” our stance forms part of a long line of spiritual resistance to all attempts to homogenize the world and the word, seeking to lower language to the lowest common denominator; in this case, taking the language of science down to the level of the mass media.

When it comes to describing a social reality, sociology and political science already have a large body of technical terms. These words gain credibility through their use in the daily press which loads them with popular notions, giving rise to substantial interference. Considering this rich body of terminology, it is inconceivable that there does not exist a noun which can describe the phenomenon knows erroneously as “fundamentalism.” Of all religions, Islam is the tradition which is the most opposed to the literal interpretation of Scripture. It opposes any reading of the Quran which does not consider the various layers of meaning and their interrelationship. The Quran itself is opposed to literal exegesis. As the Prophet Muhammad explained, the Quran has seven layers of meaning, and each of these seven levels contain numerous other levels of meaning which help interpret the others. Both Sufi and Shia Gnostics share this point of view.

[ Note: According to a hadith, the Prophet Muhammad said: “The Quran has a beautiful exterior and a profound interior”. He said that “The Quran has an inner dimension, and that inner dimenion has an inner dimension up to seven inner dimensions”. Other versions of the hadith explain that each of the seven levels has seventy to seven hundred levels. Each inner level is more profound than the previous one, yet each level contains and illuminates the others. According to some sources, each dot on the Arabic letters of the Quran contains 70,000 meanings. The numbers 7, 70, 700, and 70,000 are symbolic in nature. They are used to indicate that the interpretation of the Quran is limitless and inexhaustible. Attempting to empty the Quran would be as absurd as attempting to empty the ocean in a glass. The Quran will always be protected for any such attempts eminating from literalist or Gnostic sectors.

As Imam Ali has explained:

“There is no Quranic verse but it has four meanings: an outer one, an inner one ; a limit and a divine designation [“something which is absolute”]. The outer meaning is for oral recitation. The inner meaning is for in-depth understanding. The limit determines the legal and the illegal. The divine design is what Allah proposes to achieve in humankind by means of each verse.”

The Sixth Imam, Jafar al-Sadiq, said that: “The Divine Book contains four modes: enunciated expression, allusion; hidden meanings relating to the subtle word, and elevated metaphysical truths. The enunciated expression is the one which applies to all believers; the allusion concerns the spiritual elite; the hidden meanings are the domain of the Holy Friends of the Divine; and the elevated metaphysical truths belong to the Prophets.”]

Since Sufism and Shiaism are both spiritual branches of Islam, they are the ones that least deserve the groundless label of “fundamentalism.” None of these two branches of Islam engage in a dry literalist interpretation of the Scripture or the Prophetic Traditions and neither of them adopt characteristics of Catholic political conservatism known as integrismo. Islamic activists are not “fundamentalists.” With the exception of the Wahhabis, they are not literalists. Islamic activists are not opposed to science and modernity. They are opposed to secularism. Merely because they are opposed to liberalism does not mean that they are conservatives. They are political and economic centrists. If one does not wish to accept our proposal to replace the term “fundamentalist” with that of “traditional principialists,” then it would suffice to simply refer to them as “traditionalists.” Islamic activists are traditional Muslims who advocate a re-rooting in the principles of faith.

Our goal in writing this is to call for greater accuracy in socio-political, religious, and philosophical terminology. Besides providing a proper definition for the term “fundamentalism,” we explained the nature of this religious phenomenon. We examined whether its application to Islam was justified and found that it was excessive. The term “fundamentalism,” when applied to Islam, simply fails to distinguish between radical reformist literalists like the Wahhabis and genuine Muslims, disenchanted with secularism and liberalism, who wish to defend the fundamentals of faith of Islam from outside interference or distortion. We noted that the term “fundamentalist,” traditionally applied to literalist Protestants, is now almost exclusively applied to radical, violent, and intolerant expressions of Islam, without analyzing the problem in depth. When properly contextualized, so-called “Islamic fundamentalism” is not a cause, it is an effect. It is not an action, it is a reaction. It is not aggressive, it is defensive. It is a response to centuries of Western colonialism and cultural imperialism.

As part of its anti-Islamic onslaught, the Western world tries and tests the patience of Muslims, deliberately provoking them by insulting their faith, its religious symbols, mocking their lifestyle, the values they most treasure, and even slandering the Prophet Muhammad. These provocations are not isolated incidents. They form part of a campaign to offend Muslim sensibilities organized by Western operatives and agents-provocateurs. Their purpose is two-fold. Their first goal is to determine the depth of commitment to Islam in a certain region, to see whether more political pressure needs to be placed or whether it can be eased. The second goal is to incite violent reactions from Muslims in order to depict them as intolerant and backwards. In most cases, Western media focuses exclusively on the effect, and not on the cause. In the event that they mention the cause, they never contextualize it. They trivialize the offence to make the reaction seem all the more absurd to Western readers and viewers. Western arrogance, with its notions of cultural supremacy towards traditional cultures continues to be a source of permanent conflict throughout the world. Unless people are Westernized in their attitude, attire, and lifestyle, they are condemned as backwards. This attitude of cultural superiority is no longer a simple prejudice. It has become a motive to encourage cultural, linguistic, and political assimilation of the entire Islamic world.

Many “progressive” Westerners are fascinated with showing off their “cultural superiority.” They are fond of contrasting their “tolerance” with traditional cultures which, for the sole fact that they are not ostentatiously “modern,” are deemed backwards. In the Western world, it suffices for a Muslim student to appear in public with some “ostentatious” religious symbol like the hijab to offend the sensibilities of a European president. As soon as an incident like this comes to the fore, reactionary secular fundamentalists, the guardians of the flame of liberty which burns in the altar of modernity, rush forth in the name of “democratic values.” They rise up to show off their “progressive mentality” and their incomparable “cultural superiority.” They pass laws suppressing the civil and religious liberties of Muslim women which, had they been passed by so-called “Islamic fundamentalists,” would have been denounced as backwards and medieval when in fact the laws of modesty called for by Muslim activists are merely a normal defensive reaction to so-called “progressive” and “modern” ideas.

In the Western world, “freedom of expression,” “democracy,” “liberalism” and “secularism” have all been used as a double-edged sword. As the Native American saying goes: “The white man speaks with a forked tongue.” With the help of the mass media, terms like “freedom of expression,” “democracy,” “liberalism,” and “secularism” are a highly effective instrument. They serve to construct public opinion in accord with the interests of the powers that be, supporting or discrediting any movement in accord with their interests. The Muslims of the world have long understood the hypocrisy of Western rhetoric. However, as Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadhlullah observed in the 1980’s, the West claims to defend human rights and international justice while violating them at home and abroad: “Human rights are for them, not us.” Proud of its double-speak and unveiled hypocrisy, the Western world demands the Islamic world to respect freedom of religion and freedom of conscience while at the same time denying those liberties to the Muslims living in their midst, by prohibiting “ostentatious displays of religious symbols.” If Muslims nations require women to cover themselves, it is denounced as an oppressive violation of human rights. If Western nations oblige Muslim women to uncover themselves, it is viewed as an act of progress. The double-standards of the Western world speak for themselves.

THE END

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